Epstein Secrets

ters that may result - 21 - EFTA00731451 in a deprivation of life, liberty, or property." Perkins, 576 So. 2d at 1312; see also United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008) (plurality opinion) ("Under a long line of our decisions, the tie must go to the defendant. The rule of lenity requir

levant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern" would modify only "electronic media, computer programs, or computer services." See State ex rel. Owens v. Pearson, 156 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 1963) ("[F]ollowing an enumeration in a series, a qualifying phrase will be read as limited to the last of the se

and (4) a series of intervening nouns. § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla. Stat. (1999); see also Bismarck Lumber, 314 U.S. at 100; Bodden, 877 So. 2d at 685; Owens, 156 So. 2d at 5; Wagner, 88 So. 2d 612-13. In sum, there is only one acceptable, grammatically sound interpretation of the statute—the plain-text

criminal statute could support both a narrow or broad application of the federal criminal law, "the tie must go to the defendant." United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. and Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S (June 2, 2008), Slip Op. at 6. 2 February 25, 2003 Trafficking in Persons National Security Presi

AO to do so, it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to

ernment had to show that Sims benefited financially from Owen's sexual activity and that Sims knew that (a) force or coercion would be used to cause Owens to engage in a criminal sex act or (b) that Owens was under the age of 18.) (emphasis added). Again, none of these factors is present in this case.

ecution is to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court's very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court's interpretive methodology when it comes to federal criminal law—powerfully demonst

AO to do so, it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to

ernment had to show that Sims benefited financially from Owen's sexual activity and that Sims knew that (a) force or cocrcion would be used to cause Owens to engage in a criminal sex act or (b) that Owens was under the age of 18.) (emphasis added). Again, none of these factors is present in this case.

secution is to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court’s very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court’s interpretive methodology when it comes to federal criminal law—powerfully demonstra

vernment had to show that Sims benefited financially from Owen’s sexual activity and that Sims knew that (a) force or coercion would be used to cause Owens to engage in a criminal sex act or (b) that Owens was under the age of 18.) (emphasis added). Again, none of these factors is present in this case. T

criminal statute could support both a narrow or broad application of the federal criminal law, "the tie must go to the defendant." United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. and Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S (June 2, 2008), Slip Op. at 6. 2 February 25, 2003 Trafficking in Persons National Security Presi

ernment had to show that Sims benefited financially from Owen's sexual activity and that Sims knew that (a) force or coercion would be used to cause Owens to engage in a criminal sex act or (b) that Owens was under the age of 18.) (emphasis added). Again, none of these factors is present in this case.