Epstein Secrets

mpelled testimonial aspect." United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36, 120 S.Ct. 2037, 2043 (2000). In explaining the application of the privilege, the Supreme Court stated: We have held that "the act of production" itself may implicitly communicate "statements of fact." By "producing documents in compliance wit

convict the witness of a crime or could aid in the development of other incriminating evidence that can be used at trial. Id; Pillsbury Company v. Conboy, 495 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 608 (1983). The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the scope of the Fifth Amendment Privilege includes the ci

omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—even all intentional misstatements—necessarily require suppression. A

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—even all intentional misstatements—necessarily require suppression. A

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—even all intentional misstatements—necessarily require suppression. A

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—even all intentional misstatements—necessarily require suppression. A

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—even all intentional misstatements—necessarily require suppression. A

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre