Epstein Secrets

atement reveals how inapposite a federal prosecution is to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court's very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court's interpretive methodology when it comes to federal

erson ..."). § 2423(b) is not such a statute. Federal court decisions watering down the "for the purpose of " requi ment fly in the face of the two Suprems Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen'. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak l

statute makes clear, the essence of this crime is the communication itself—not the resulting act. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Murrell, underscores the point: The defendant in Bailey contended that attempt under § 2422(6) 'requires the specific intent to commit illegal sexual acts

ions—a description used by CEOS itself—it cannot be shown that Mr. Epstein violated any of the three federal statutes identified by prosecutors. As the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar make clear, federal law may not be stretched in that manner, and the current federal investigation relies, as

nt can be found guilty of that offense only if...the defendant believed that such individual was less than (18) years of age..."); United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) (§ 2422(b) requires that the defendant knowingly target a minor). Importantly, then, all the elements must be

statute makes clear, the essence of this crime is the communication itself—not the resulting act. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Murrell, underscores the point: The defendant in Bailey contended that attempt under § 2422(b) `requires the specific intent to commit illegal sexual acts

atement reveals how inapposite a federal prosecution is to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court's very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court's interpretive methodology when it comes to federal

nt can be found guilty of that offense only if...the defendant believed that such individual was less than (18) years of age..."); United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (I I1° Cir. 2004) (§ 2422(b) requires that the defendant knowingly target a minor). Importantly, then, all the elements must be

der to sustain a conviction. In particular, § 2422(b) requires that the defendant specifically intended to target a minor. ke,ligh, United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]o prove an attempt the government must first prove that [defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific

S.Ct. 962, 85 LEd. 4416, and Douglas I. City of Jeannette, supra. 01 We think a more likely explanation of the use of this phrase is that the Su- preme Court had in mind such cases as Hague v. C. I. 0., supra, in which it ap- peared that plaintiffs seeking to hold peace- ful meetings and to distribute lit

ate act. For this he was adjudged by the Circuit Court to be in contempt, and put in custody of the United States marshal. Thereupon he applied to the Supreme Court for leave to file a petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, which the court denied. The act was held to be unconstitutional because, am

the possibility more appealing" an "to stimulate the occurrence of." United States Rashkovski, VI F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir.2002); United States Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir.2004). This Court rests on the plain meaning of the words in the statute in deciding whether the Government has sat

is alleged crimes. Applying Masha's Law thereby would revive Defendant's exposure to penalties in direct contravention of the Er Post Facto clause. The Supreme Court's decision in California v. Stogner, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly illustrates the point. In Stogner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex

acility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the scienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific intent to per

is alleged crimes. Applying Masha's Law thereby would revive Defendant's exposure to penalties in direct contravention of the Er Post Facto clause. The Supreme Court's decision in California v. Stogner, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly illustrates the point. In Stogner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex

acility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the scienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific intent to per

is alleged crimes. Applying Masha's Law thereby would revive Defendant's exposure to penalties in direct contravention of the Er Post Facto clause. The Supreme Court's decision in California v. Stogner, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly illustrates the point. In Stogner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex

acility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the scienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific intent to per

is alleged crimes. Applying Masha's Law thereby would revive Defendant's exposure to penalties in direct contravention of the Er Post Facto clause. The Supreme Court's decision in California v. Stogner, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly illustrates the point. In Stogner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex

acility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the scienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific intent to per

is alleged crimes. Applying Masha's Law thereby would revive Defendant's exposure to penalties in direct contravention of the Er Post Facto clause. The Supreme Court's decision in California v. Stogner, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly illustrates the point. In Stogner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex

acility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the scienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific intent to per

is alleged crimes. Applying Masha's Law thereby would revive Defendant's exposure to penalties in direct contravention of the Ex Post Facto clause. The Supreme Court's decision in California Stogner 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly illustrates the point. In Stegner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex cri

facility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the scienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States'. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific intent to per