Epstein Secrets

ations Center in Oahu. It employed threat analysts to surrep- titiously monitor the secret activities of potential enemies, mainly China, Russia, and North Korea. A large part of their job was to make transparent to the United States the hostile activities of the Russian and Chinese services so that they posed

intelligence coups through the eyes, and mind-set, of their KGB handler might provide some historical context for the Snowden defection. So I invited Cherkashin to lunch at Gusto, a quiet Italian restaurant, located near the Chekhov Theater in Moscow. Cherkashin, a tall thin man with silver hair, showed up p

ontext for the Snowden defection. So I invited Cherkashin to lunch at Gusto, a quiet Italian restaurant, located near the Chekhov Theater in Moscow. Cherkashin, a tall thin man with silver hair, showed up promptly at 1:00 p.m., wearing an elegant gray suit and dark tie. He walked with a spry step. Because he

811 9/30/16 e13.am | | 324 | Notes to pages 214-231 212 “it stays secret’: De, “Former NSA Lawyer on ‘Harm’ of Edward Snowden’s Revelations.” 212 North Korea in 1968: John Prados and Jack Cheevers, “USS Pueblo: LBJ Con- sidered Nuclear Weapons,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 453, J

cknowledges: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.” 154 “absence of evidence”: Carl Sagan, Cosmos (New York: Random House, 1980), 49. 154 “The greatest trick”: Cherkashin, interview with author. The quotation from The Usual Suspects was adopted by the movie from Charles Baudelaire’s observation “La plus belle des rus

th author. Cuarter 25 Through the Looking Glass 254 “There's definitely a deep state”: Vanden Heuvel and Cohen, “Snowden Speaks.” 255 according to Cherkashin: Cherkashin, interview with author. 258 Pelton had left the NSA: George E. Curry, “Ex-intelligence Expert Guilty of Espionage,” Chicago Tribune, Jun

xceptions, the flights to them had stopovers in a country that was an ally of the US, and which could seize Snowden. The three exceptions were China, North Korea (via China) and Russia. The only one of these three countries, or any other country, that Snowden is known to have dealt with directly during his 33

then cited the signature line from the movie Zhe Usual Suspects “The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist.” Cherkashin thinly smiled and said “CIA denial [of moles] certainly helped.” HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020275 124 In view of such past successes of the Russian intellig

mous spy delivered 27 computer discs containing hundreds of secret documents revealing the sources and methods of American intelligence. According to Cherkashin, it was the largest haul of top secrets documents ever obtained by the KGB (although it was only a small fraction of the number of top secret NSA, De

den on Cyber Warfare, Nova, PBS. January 8, 2015 > “One million dollars for...”—This payment was revealed in the Sony documents allegedly stolen by North Korea. They were posted on the Wikileaks website. Author’s interview with Oliver Stone. “Putin’s telethon on...”-- Elias Grolla, “Snowden Called in to P

201 “Tt was the information in his head that we wanted.” Cherkashin said that as KGB rarely got access to any NSA officer, it was worth the risk. So he was given $5,000 in cash and a plane ticket to Vienna, where he w

the NSA would have received its full attention after he contacted Russian officials in Hong Kong. While the tactics of the SVR may have changed since Cherkashin retired, its objectives remained the same. And the NSA remained its principal target. Nor is there any reason to doubt that it still measures success

e countries had stopovers in a country that was an ally of the United States, where officials could seize Snowden. The three excep- tions were China, North Korea (via China), and Russia. The only one of these three countries that Snowden is known to have had contact with directly during his thirty-three-day s

then cited the signature line from the movie The Usual Suspects, “The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn’t exist,” Cherkashin thinly smiled and said, “CIA denial [of moles] certainly helped.” In view of such past successes of the Russian intelligence services, it cannot be