Epstein Secrets

e countries had stopovers in a country that was an ally of the United States, where officials could seize Snowden. The three excep- tions were China, North Korea (via China), and Russia. The only one of these three countries that Snowden is known to have had contact with directly during his thirty-three-day s

dozen such decoy tickets to confuse Snowden’s possible pursuers in U.S. intelligence. The only actual ticket she bought for Snowden, according to an Aeroflot official, was one to Moscow at the last min- @ ute. She bought a ticket for herself on the same flight, leaving on @ June 23. The source of the mon

ations Center in Oahu. It employed threat analysts to surrep- titiously monitor the secret activities of potential enemies, mainly China, Russia, and North Korea. A large part of their job was to make transparent to the United States the hostile activities of the Russian and Chinese services so that they posed

had a role in acquiring the product of the self- described “single point of failure,” would work to cover their tracks in the affair even before the Aeroflot plane carrying Snowden touched down at Sheremetyevo International Airport on June 23. If any false flag operations had been used to trick, mislead, o

811 9/30/16 e13.am | | 324 | Notes to pages 214-231 212 “it stays secret’: De, “Former NSA Lawyer on ‘Harm’ of Edward Snowden’s Revelations.” 212 North Korea in 1968: John Prados and Jack Cheevers, “USS Pueblo: LBJ Con- sidered Nuclear Weapons,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 453, J

lakic Keith Alexander: AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite Vladimir Putin: AP Photo/Ivan Sekretarev Julian Assange: Anthony Devlin/PA Wire @ Russian airline Aeroflot: Courtesy Ena and Ines Talakic @ Michael Hayden: Rex Features via AP Images U.S. base at Yokota: Courtesy Ena and Ines Talakic Snowden’s home in Hawa

w on the activities of adversary nations in the Pacific region, it was able to monitor the ballistic missile tests and submarine activities of China, North Korea and Russia. As the NSA developed it, this Hawatian base became one of its primary regional bases for gathering Asian communications intelligence. By

ssian intelligence activity in Hong Kong. The NSA also reportedly intercepted contacts between these Russian officials and Russian representatives of Aeroflot, the Russian state-owned airline flying between Hong Kong and Moscow. Aeroflot, like most other international carriers, ordinarily requires internati

xceptions, the flights to them had stopovers in a country that was an ally of the US, and which could seize Snowden. The three exceptions were China, North Korea (via China) and Russia. The only one of these three countries, or any other country, that Snowden is known to have dealt with directly during his 33

ozen such decoy tickets to confuse Snowden’s pursuers in US and British intelligence. The only actual tickets she bought for Snowden, according to an Aeroflot official, was a one-way ticket to Moscow. She paid for it at the last minute. She also bought a ticket for self on the same flight leaving on June 23

den on Cyber Warfare, Nova, PBS. January 8, 2015 > “One million dollars for...”—This payment was revealed in the Sony documents allegedly stolen by North Korea. They were posted on the Wikileaks website. Author’s interview with Oliver Stone. “Putin’s telethon on...”-- Elias Grolla, “Snowden Called in to P

proved allowing HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020369 218 Snowden to come to Russia. Putin’s s decision no doubt set in motion the operation to exfiltrate him on Aeroflot, the state-controlled airline. We know that the Russian government acted in advance to facilitate Snowden’s trip from Hong Kong. Without such an int