case officers. Instead, he set his espionage in motion by passing an anonymous letter to Victor Cherkashin, the KGB spy handler working undercover at the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C. From the start of his work for the KGB, Hanssen laid down his own rules. The KGB would deliver cash from which all the fingerprint

what he described “reasons of conscience.” Specifically, he said he objected to the CIA’s covert support of Latin America dictators. After contacting the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, he defected to Cuba, where he leaked information that exposed CIA operations. Although Agee insisted he was a whistle-blower, and he

ell-regarded and competent player in the game of nations: he has served =s Second Secretary of the Soviet UN mission in New York, First =ecretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Deputy Director of the =oviet Department of International Organizations in Moscow, Permanent =ussian representative to NATO in Bruss

y to monitor unsuspecting individuals abroad, he clearly succeeded. Just as Robert Hanssen had compromised the NSA’s interception of communication at the Soviet Embassy in the 1990s, Snowden compromised the NSA’s interception of Jihadist targets on the Internet. The Snowden intervention was soon felt by the CIA. “Wi