haracterized by 'malice,' or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort."' Metro. Life Ins. Co.' McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)). Rather, "the conduct as a matter of law must be so outrageous

f mental suffering; (2) outrageous conduct; (3) the conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the distress was severe. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985). Whether conduct is outrageous enough to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a ques

lly speaks to 24 that at length where the cause of action was 25 delineated and discussed fully - I think goes EFTA00776413 49 1 back to the McCarson case and then its prodigy, 2 but to prove a claim for intentional infliction 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Court that, within the bounds of reasonablen

f mental suffering; (2) outrageous conduct; (3) the conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the distress was severe. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985). Whether conduct is outrageous enough to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a ques

f mental suffering; (2) outrageous conduct; (3) the conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the distress was severe. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985). Whether conduct is outrageous enough to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a ques

f mental suffering; (2) outrageous conduct; (3) the conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the distress was severe. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985). Whether conduct is outrageous enough to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a ques