into the old national habit of insecurity - all of these have encouraged a searching exploration. The demands of domestic politics, the instincts of the Chinese Communist Party and the inevitable practical questions of security and reform all produce sensible questions. China needs oil, for instance. Must she project power i

usive of America’s intelligence adversaries. Its espionage organi- zations are hidden behind layers of bureaucracy in the Ministry of State Security, Chinese Communist Party structures, and the second, third, and fourth department of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army. Much of its cyber-espionage units are

ations. While Americans are quick to label any wariness of communist parties as McCarthyism, and while the potential for racial stereotyping is real, the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department and International Liaison Department—two of the main bodies overseeing such exchanges—are in fact active and well resour

society”’ by about 2020, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Com- munist Party, and the modernization goal of China becoming a f

TITUTE, NEW YORK AN ADDRESS TO THE LEE KUAN YEW SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE TUESDAY 26 JUNE, 2018 On 22-23 June 2018, the Chinese Communist Party concluded its Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, the second since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Party and Chairman

Western liberal model that has dominated international organizations since the end of the Cold War. The Reality These concerns are misplaced. First, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a high level of suspicion toward Western proposals at the international level and within the executive organs of the United Nations in part

he eventual consequences was the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party, which for the last 70 years has ruled the countr