iprocity by image scoring. Nature 393.573-577. Osborne. M.J.. Rubinstein. A.. 1994. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press. Cambridge. Massachusetts. Rapoport. A.. Chammah. A.M.. 1965. Prisoners Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. University of Michigan Press. Ann Arbor. Michigan. Roussel. F.. B

bc. This is due to the assumption that the reward payoff must be larger than the average of the temptation payoff and the suckers payoff (see, e.g. Rapoport and Chammah. 1965; Axelrod, 1984), in which case we have 02 > b c )2- bc +(b c ) 2 (- (- > bc. (28) 2 In what follows, it will be importan

ven if there are obvious advantages to mutual cooperation. For example, in the classic two-player game called the Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod. 1984). cooperation results in a "reward payoff' if one's partner also cooperates but a "suckers payoff' if one's partne

per. Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chammah, A. M., & Rapoport, A. (1965). Prisoner’s dilemma; a study in conflict and coopera- tion. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan. Chwe, M. (2013). Rational ritual: Cult

Feyerick, Deborah Client N Douglas Robertson Foros Advisors LLC Client N Douglas Robertson Foros Securities, LLC Client N Douglas Robertson Rapoport, Esta M. Client N Douglas Robertson Forrester, Andrew H. Client N Douglas Robertson Prignano, Barbara Client N Douglas Robertson Jawhary, Mo