Document DOJ-COURT-432 is an order from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida regarding a motion for a protective order filed by Igor Zinoview, a former employee of Jeffrey Epstein.
This document pertains to the case of Jane Doe NO. 2 against Jeffrey Epstein. It addresses Igor Zinoview's motion to prevent his deposition, which the Court denies. The court explains that preventing a deposition is rare and not warranted in this case, as Zinoview's employment with Epstein as a driver and bodyguard does not exempt him from potentially providing relevant testimony.
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO: 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON JANE DOE NO. 2, Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. ____________________________________/ Related cases: 08-80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80994, 08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469, 09-80591, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092 ____________________________________/ ORDER THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Third Party Witness, Igor Zinoview’s, Motion for Protective Order (D.E. #402). For the following reasons, Third Party Witness Zinoview’s Motion for Protective Order is denied. By this Motion Third Party Witness Zinoview, who has been employed by Defendant Epstein as a driver and bodyguard since 2005, seeks an order preventing the taking of his deposition on the basis that his employment with Epstein post-dates the facts giving rise to these cases and that “at not time has he discussed with Mr. Epstein any issues involving Mr. Epstein’s criminal case or any the cases or issues involved with civil Plaintiffs.” Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 432 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/03/2009
Page 1 of 3 2 Zinoview’s Mtn., p.1-3. For “good cause” shown the Court may issue a protective order preventing or delaying a deposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see McCarthy v. Barnett Bank of Poly County, 876 F.2d 89, 91 (11th Cir. 1989). An order completely prohibiting a deposition from going forward, however, is rare, and only resorted to in extraordinary circumstances. Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F.2d 649, 651 (5 Cir. 1979)(noting that it is very unusual for trial court to th prohibit the taking of a deposition altogether, and absent extraordinary circumstances, such order would likely be in error); Jennings v. Family Management, 201 F.R.D. 272 (D.D.C. 2001)(stating that a “complete prohibition of a deposition is an extraordinary measure which should be resorted to only in rare occasions.”). In this instance the Court agrees with Plaintiff that neither Zinoview’s conclusory affidavit in which he denies any knowledge of the facts giving rise to these cases, nor his Motion provide anything even approaching the “extraordinary circumstances” necessary to justify a complete prohibition of his deposition. Nor, does the Court find any basis to limit the questions that may be asked Zinoview at deposition. At the deposition Zinoview’s counsel is free to invoke any privileges afforded him by the applicable procedural rules. In accordance with the above and foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Third Party Witness, Igor Zinoview’s, Motion for Protective Order (D.E. #402) is DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this December 3rd, 2009, in Chambers, at West Palm Beach, Florida. Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 432 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/03/2009
Page 2 of 3 3 LINNEA R. JOHNSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE CC: The Honorable Kenneth A. Marra All Counsel of Record Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 432 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/03/2009



