Epstein Secrets

ation to journalists, as will be recalled, was two part. First, he @ said he had planned to board the next fight to Cuba and from there @ proceed to Ecuador. He said that he was unable to board this flight because his passport had been invalidated by the U.S. government while he was flying to Russia. Seco

ng. Snowden could not have acted entirely alone. It will be recalled that the deepest part of his penetration was during the five weeks he worked at the National Threat Operations Center in Hawaii as a contract employee of Booz Allen Hamilton. It was there that he copied Level 3 files, including the so-called road map to the gaps in A

her to Russia and provided her with a multi-entry Russian visa. In June 2012, after the extradition order was upheld, he jumped bail and fled to the Ecuador embassy in London. For the next year, his only visible means of income was a weekly program from the embassy. It was sponsored by RT Television, a Mo

odes?” Who will guard the guards themselves? Less than three years after the NSA had received the Poteyev warning, a 29-year old civilian trainee at the National Threat Operations Center, demonstrated its glaring vulnerability. Instead of guarding secrets, Snowden stole them. General Hayden described the Snowden breach as the “most se

have been a more certain place to meet Greenwald. If some consideration by Snowden precluded Brazil as a destination, Snowden could have also gone to Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba, Iceland, or Venezuela, which are also countries that do not have active extradition treaties with the United States. Yet, instead of

peration, he could not have acted entirely alone. It will be recalled that the deepest part of his penetration was during the five weeks he worked at the National Threat Operations Center in Hawaii as a contract employee of Booz Allen Hamilton. It was there that he copied level 3 files, including the so-called road map to the gaps in A