Epstein Secrets

udicial SO EFTA00299070 process," id., which prohibits "parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001). "Stated simply, the doctrine of judicial estoppel rests on the principle that "absent any good explanation,

nce value, the Government's 42 EFTA00299062 enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan..." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). As such, the decision to prosecute is "particularly ill-suited to judicial review." Id. "Few subjects ar

ervices B. Y., 818 F.3d 733, 741 (D.C.Cir. 2016), quoting Newman v United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C.Cir. 1967). As the Supreme Court noted in Wayte, "[j]udicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the crim

ir. 2002) (citation omitted). Judicial estoppel prohibits "parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001). The Eleventh Circuit has identified three factors to be considered in determining whether to apply the equit

ment's enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also Fokker, 818 F.3d at 737-738 (noting the long-settled understandings about the independence o

ir. 2002) (citation omitted). Judicial estoppel prohibits "parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001). The Eleventh Circuit has identified three factors to be considered in determining whether to apply the equit

ment's enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also Fokker, 818 F.3d at 737-738 (noting the long-settled understandings about the independence o

e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-66 (1996) (examining the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on racially- motivated charging); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (holding due process bars prosecution in retaliation for exercising fundamental rights); Kolender v. Lawso

on the approval from a state prosecutor or a judge. *° Rhode Island authorizes private prosecutions only for misdemeanors. 8’ Under state common law, New Hampshire might permit the same for nonjailable offenses. °° Beyond that, judges in many states can issue an arrest warrant or criminal summons based on a priv