Epstein Secrets

ranged from indifference to accommodation. The Saudis see Iran trying to encircle them with its Quds Force active in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and their own eastern province. The Saudis see an Iranian effort to shift the balance of forces in the region dramatically in Tehran's favor, wheth

February, Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid al-Attiyah visited Tehran for that purpose. The source added that last week, Iran gave the green light for Meshaal's visit after contacts between Zahar and Marwan Issa, a senior leader in the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' armed wing. This long overdue v

financial support, as it signaled that there is no veto on the movement by decision-making circles in Tehran. Furthermore, Hamas is optimistic that Meshaal's visit will result in increasing Iran's financial support. The latter was confirmed by Ahmed Youssef, a former political adviser to Palestinian l

ilateral relationship. Al-Monitor has learned from a source close to Hamas' political leadership that Iran is also planning to receive Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal soon, after a long tug of war marked by undisclosed shuttle discussions. The source said that Qatar was mediating with Iran to restore ties with Ha

s between Zahar and Marwan Issa, a senior leader in the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' armed wing. This long overdue visit will culminate in Meshaal meeting with Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In his meeting with Meshaal and in his recent and first visit to Qatar, Islamic Jihad S

ns. Protests against the rival authorities in Gaza and the West Bank haven't become the kind of full-scale revolts that hit Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria. But there is a growing sense that the leaderships of both Fatah (in charge in the West Bank) and Hamas (which controls Gaza) have lost m

1878 "offers of welcome" from Egypt's new President Mohammed Morsi as well as the emir of Qatar, Sheik Hamad al-Thani. A native of the West Bank, Meshaal has already ruled out moving to Gaza, where M be surrounded by rivals and even enemies. He holds a Jordanian passport, but could only settle in Am

hanging came this week with the announcement that top Hamas leader Khalid al-Meshaal is to step down after 16 years, triggering a succession race. Meshaal has had to leave Damascus (after 13 years) because he indicated support for the Syrian uprising. People close to him claim that he's had EFTA007118

uld not confuse stagnation with stability. The fact that the royals continue to rule when autocratic regimes have been swept aside in Egypt, Libya, Yemen and perhaps soon in Syria, doesn't mean this U.S. ally is stable. The kingdom faces multiple problems: Unemployment is 40% among 20- to 24-year-old

blic fracture since its founding. The Gaza faction sees little reason to make concessions and is particularly skeptical about Hamas Politburo chief Khaled Meshaal's sudden embrace of Palestinian reconciliation with the West Bank-based rival Fatah party, fearing the move will end the group's five-year run as t

s secretive elections for its Shura Council leadership body and appoints a new Politburo chief. Some EFTA00671799 close to the group predict that Meshaal, despite his recent announcement that he would not seek reelection, will win another four-year term and be given a mandate to implement a unity gov

conflict mediation. It has tried, and usually succeeded, in calming tempers and forging agreements between opponents — whether between Eritrea and Yemen in their dispute over the Hamish Islands in 1996; or between Eritrea and Sudan a couple of years later; or between Yemen and its Huthi rebel moveme

e Brotherhood mainstream for Hamas may be embracing its terms, seeking political rather than military strategies to advance the Palestinian cause. Meshaal has certainly made a number of statements hinting at a shift away from arms towards "popular resistance," although such matters are likely to be a

Iran — and with it the end of any illusion Tehran might have harbored of exerting influence in the new revolutionary Arab mainstream. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal is now ensconced in Qatar's capital, Doha, while deputy leader Moussa Abu Marzouk has set up shop in Cairo. And Hamas leaders used last Friday's m

ns. Protests against the rival authorities in Gaza and the West Bank haven't become the kind of full-scale revolts that hit Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria. But there is a growing sense that the leaderships of both Fatah (in charge in the West Bank) and Hamas (which controls Gaza) have lost

anging came this week with the announcement that top Hamas leader Khalid al-Meshaal is to step down after 16 years, triggering a succession race. Meshaal has had to leave Damascus (after 13 years) because he indicated support for the Syrian uprising. People close to him claim that he's had "offers of

had "offers of welcome" from Egypt's new President Mohammed Morsi as well as the emir of Qatar, Sheik Hamad al- Thani. A native of the West Bank, Meshaal has already ruled out moving to Gaza, where he'd be surrounded by rivals and even enemies. He holds a Jordanian passport, but could only settle in

conflict mediation. It has tried, and usually succeeded, in calming tempers and forging agreements between opponents — whether between Eritrea and Yemen in their dispute over the Hamish Islands in 1996; or between Eritrea and Sudan a couple of years later; or between Yemen and its Huthi rebel moveme

Iran — and with it the end of any illusion Tehran might have harbored of exerting influence in the new revolutionary Arab mainstream. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal is now ensconced in Qatar's capital, Doha, while deputy leader Moussa Abu Marzouk has set up shop in Cairo. And Hamas leaders used last Friday's mi

he Brotherhood mainstream for Hamas may be embracing its terms, seeking political rather than military strategies to advance the Palestinian cause. Meshaal has certainly made a number of statements hinting at a shift away from arms towards "popular resistance," although such matters are likely to be a

e world and they need us. Fine, but relentlessly keep the pressure on them to improve their rule. Had we begun this process with Abdullah Saleh of Yemen in 1978 or with Mubarak in 1981, things could have been very different by 2011. But we didn't. TB: Egypt might be the test case. EFTA00683502 DP

nder Sheik Ahmed Yassin proposed a long truce with Israel. But today, such a proposal is more realistic and is attributed to Hamas's current leader Khaled Meshaal. Hamas in 2013 is different than Hamas in 1993. Hamas is now an influential player and its statements and stances are taken into account by regiona

al intelligence are calling for an unprecedented demand for data centers in the United States. • CSIS: Houthi Aggression and a Roadmap for Peace in Yemen— Wednesday, September 4, 2024. Location: CSIS, 10:00 AM. Houthi attacks on international shipping, which the group connects to the Israel-Mamas war,

iminal charges against top leaders of Hamas for their involvement in the October 7th attack on Israel. The charges allege that Yahya Sinwar, Khaled Meshaal, Ali Baraka, and three deceased Hamas leaders orchestrated the attack that killed over 1,200 people, including 40 Americans. "As outlined in our com

ounder Sheik Ahmed Yassin proposed a long truce with Israel. But today, such a proposal is more realistic and is attributed to Hamas’s current leader Khaled Meshaal. Hamas in 2013 is different than Hamas in 1993. Hamas is now an influential player and its statements and stances are taken into account by regional

the world and they need us. Fine, but relentlessly keep the pressure on them to improve their rule. Had we begun this process with Abdullah Saleh of Yemen in 1978 or with Mubarak in 1981, things could have been very different by 2011. But we didn’t. TB: Egypt might be the test case. DP: Well, it’s a b

ounder Sheik Ahmed Yassin proposed a long truce with Israel. But today, such a proposal is more realistic and is attributed to Hamas's current leader Khaled Meshaal. Hamas in 2013 is different than Hamas in 1993. Hamas is now an influential player and its statements and stances are taken into account by regional

the world and they need us. Fine, but relentlessly keep the pressure on them to improve their rule. Had we begun this process with Abdullah Saleh of Yemen in 1978 or with Mubarak in 1981, things could have been very different by 2011. But we didn't. TB: Egypt might be the test case. DP: Well, it's a bit