Epstein Secrets

ruples and limits. There would be no treaty of=surrender we could enforce, no capital city to be subdued. Chased from Afghanistan, they turned up in Yemen and S=malia. They were soldiers of the catacombs, and they thrived in ungoverned=spaces. Targeted killing wa= the response <http://www.businessweek

s brought our way the jihadists. Two products of Mubarak'= Egypt must be figured into an audit of that regime: the Cairene al Qaeda =eader Ayman al- Zawahiri and the psychopath Mohammad Atta, who led the deat= pilots of 9/11. It was folly and naiveté to think that we really knew and could befriend the tyr

spring will end is anyone's quess lan Black Article 2. | Al-Ahram Weekly Netanyahu and the Arab spring Abdel-Moneim Said AnicleS- |The New Yorker Zawahiri at the Helm Lawrence Wright Article 4. NYT Does Foreign Policy Matter? Roger Cohen Article. | Los Angeles Times European Union: Everywhere you lo

ternative is the cruelty of the dictators' fightbacks in Tripoli and Damascus. Regional differences were ignored in the chain reaction that followed. Yemen's protests were galvanised by the drama in Cairo's Tahrir Square but they also involved tribalism, elite rivalry and a small but alarming al-Qaida pr

religious base. In fact, the relationship between Hamas and al Qaeda, and between Hamas and al Qaeda-like jihadists in Gaza, is far more contentious. Zawahiri has blasted Hamas for adhering to ceasefires with Israel, not immediately implementing Islamic law in Gaza, and otherwise deviating from the pure fai

us vision for peace. He should realize that it will be fatal for Israel to maintain control over millions of Palestinians who seek what the people of Yemen and Libya and Syria seek: freedom. Absent any hope of progress, the Palestinians will do what they can to undermine Israel. But all they have to do i

ttack on big, economically important targets — one that would HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031936 --- PAGE BREAK --- 25 match, if not outdo, the impact of 9/11. Zawahiri, by contrast, favored an opportunistic strategy of smaller strikes. • Bin Laden was a hands-on chief executive, with a role in operations planning an

eded in distancing al-Qaeda's message from core Islamic values. Concerned about this eroding base, bin Laden counseled affiliates in North Africa and Yemen to hold back on their efforts to develop a local Islamic extremist state in favor of attacking the United States and its interests. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_0