Epstein Secrets

lead you into as much trouble this quickly. Even in 1989-90, those countries were the exception and not the rule. Think Ukraine, Belarus, Yugoslavia, Romania, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and of course Russia itself. More people live in countries where the 1989-90 revolutionary wave failed to establi

lavia and Belarus or, at best, Ukraine. We, and they, may get lucky, and the revolutions in the Arab world may lead to something that looks more like Central Europe than like Central Asia. That would be a nice surprise, but we should not be placing large bets that this will actually happen. China, by the way, doe

rime minister Viktor Orban gave what has come to be known as his "illiberal democracy' speech before an ethnic Hungarian audi- ence in Bane Tu§nad, Romania.' Several points in his remarks are worth noting: Orban urged his listeners to no longer regard the 1989 triumph over communism as the reference

, and ways of doing things that had strengthened democratic governance in some of the more successful post-au- thoritarian societies, especially in Central Europe. More recently, modern authoritarian regimes have turned this concept on its head by sharing their own experiences with laws and tactics that have

ATO's presence in the periphery states of the alliance. There will have to be more NATO installations and more US troops in places like Estonia and Romania. Right now, there is a non-negligible chance that Russia might try to create facts on the ground inside one or more of the Baltic Republics. The bo

would be a smaller and more poorly situated power than the Soviet Union. Germany remains united, Poland is free, and Russia cannot hope to dominate Central Europe as the USSR once did. European fecklessness dragged the Clinton administration kicking and screaming into the morass of the bloody wars of the Yugo

hts advocates will applaud in spite of the constitutional issues, enemies of the Iranian talks will appreciate and Central Europeans from Poland to Romania will see as a sign of U.S. commitment to the region. The United States will re-emerge as an alternative to Germany and Russia. It is a brilliant st

nd that the next punch will come when he is least expecting it. The mere willingness of the United States to engage will change the expectations of Central Europe, cause tensions between the Central Europeans and the Germans and create an opening for the United States. The Pressure on Russia Of course, the

.0 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.1 1.0 1.4 2.4 -0.4 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.3 0.3 EEMEA Poland Hungary Czech Republic Romania Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan Israel Turkey South Africa GDP (% yoy) 2015F 2016F 2017F 1.0 3.4 2.7 4.5 3.7 1.9 3.5 2.4 2.7 4.0 -3.7 -

times in the last few months and, like the Turkish central bank, will likely to have to tighten further in the coming year in response to the Fed. Central Europe by contrast has been a relative island of stability over the past year, growing by around 3.6%, the fastest pace since 2008. Public investment mig

es, and ways f doing things that had strengthened democratic governance in some of the more successful post-au- thoritarian societies, especially in Central Europe. ore recently, modern authoritarian regimes have turned this concept on its head by sharing their own experiences with laws and tactics that have th

prime minister Viktor Orban gave what has come to be known as his “illiberal democracy" speech before an ethnic Hungarian audi- ence in Baile Tusnad, Romania.! Several points in his remarks are worth noting: ¢ Orban urged his listeners to no longer regard the 1989 triumph over communism as the reference p