Epstein Secrets

e patronage and will of h=s predecessor, Anwar Sadat. Mubarak had not been imaginative or brave—and that was what recommended him to the f=amboyant Sadat. Where Sadat had been unabashedly open in his identificatio= with American power, the new man would be more discreet. Where Sadat had =een a trailbl

es Union, there was no powerful intellectual lobby calling for acc=untability. The passion had dra=ned out of the progressives who had hounded Bush, Dick Cheney <http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Dick%20Cheney&site==news&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output =xml nodt=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getf

ut of the progressives who had hounded Bush, Dick Cheney <http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Dick%20Che

ly orchestrated by Di. Kissinger, who managed to create enough distance between the Unit- ed States and Israel to allow some negotiating room. Mr. Sadat felt confident enough as the "hero of the crossing" to make his famous trip to Jerusalem. Even the terrorist group of the day, the Palestine Libe

ational Committee Chairman Ken Mehlman, Sen. Lieberman's loss means "defeat- ism and isolation are now Democratic Party orthodoxy" Vice President Dick Cheney even suggested that Sen. Liebt•rman's defeat might en- courage "Al-C./atria types." according to The New )irk Times. Al-Qaeda types? They've been

Iraq's breakdown: and a dispropor- tionate Israeli response to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The mujahedetin couldn't care less about Connecticut. But Mr. Cheney and his ilk con- tinue to beat the war drum because it worked before. In 2002, then-US. Rep. Saxby Chambliss. RCa.. defeated Sen. Max Cleland, 1)-

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

about the details and timing of the initial American air strikes. At around five o’clock on the afternoon on January 16, 1991, Misha got a call from Cheney. He said “h-hour” would be at seven that evening Washington time. Three a.m. in Israel. Though we hoped to stay out, I’d now spent months coordinati

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

about the details and timing of the initial American air strikes. At around five o'clock on the afternoon on January 16, 1991, Misha got a call from Cheney. He said "h-hour" would be at seven that evening Washington time. Three a.m. in Israel. Though we hoped to stay out, I'd now spent months coordinatin