Epstein Secrets

r Sadat as Egyptian President, the Soviet-Egyptian relationship quickly deteriorated. The KGB then resorted to active measures to try to undermine Sadat's rule, including portraying the president's 30-year-old son-in-law and Foreign Minister, Ashraf Marwan, as a CIA agent, an embezzler and the man r

overnment decided to vent its anger with the Obama Administration's Syria policy by issuing statements in the Western press and by refusing to join the United Nations Security Council as a rotating member (after two years of lobbying vigorously for the post), Riyadh tried an alternative method of advancing its interests in the Le

lamped down on the Muslim Brotherhood it did so selectively because it still needed them to use as a bogeyman at home and abroad. Prior to Mubarak, Sadat used the Muslim Brotherhood to crush the Egyptian left and bury all the gains in social justice that had come with Abdel-Nasser. It is useful to r

own. They are consistent with American policy since 1967. If packaged as an American plan, they'd likely gain the support of the European Union and the United Nations Security Council. All Kerry has to do—not a small thing—is embrace them and call them his own, much as President Obama haltingly did in 2011, when he argued for "th

r 2011. It is a great deceit to deny an entire nation's right to exist. Let me narrate a strange story of American deceit. When Henry Kissinger met Sadat and introduced his six-point plan as a `Kissinger plan,' Sadat told him: "Never forget, Dr. Kissinger, I am making this agreement with the United S

e United States on certain issues. That came just days after Saudi Arabia stunned even some of its own diplomats when it refused a rotating seat on the United Nations Security Council, citing its anger over the world's failure to respond to the crisis in Syria. This spat reflects the Arab world's deepening frustration with Americ