Epstein Secrets

lamped down on the Muslim Brotherhood it did so selectively because it still needed them to use as a bogeyman at home and abroad. Prior to Mubarak, Sadat used the Muslim Brotherhood to crush the Egyptian left and bury all the gains in social justice that had come with Abdel-Nasser. It is useful to r

rom the seventh floor (the secretary's suite in Foggy Bottom), caring little about the foreign and civil service or the institutional weaknesses of the State Department. That absolutely should not be the case for an administration whose approach to the world is fundamentally diplomatic. The Obama administration is

in an unprecedented phase of strong bilateral cooperation between the two former enemies, but it was also a major cause of the unpopularity of both Sadat and Mubarak. Israel benefited from the cold peace by neutralizing the most powerful conventional force in the Arab world. It even coordinated close

ddle East and North Africa. One response that is often heard is a note of cautious optimism, captured in US President Barack Obama recent speech at the State Department when he referred to the "promise of the future." But sometimes we also hear the populist smears that have been applied to the Middle East for so l

gh. In 1977 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem in a gesture of peace. Seeing positive developments, US President Jimmy Carter invited Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to Camp David in 1978 to negotiate peace. One agreement, A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, addre

over the political spectrum; 69 percent of the country opposed the coup, one Egyptian poll showed. Worse, shocking and irresponsible rhetoric from the State Department in Washington and from other Western diplomats — calling on the Brotherhood and demonstrators to "renounce" or "avoid" violence (even when also con

untry. Maybe a trip for medical treatment? Mubarak dismissed the idea. He’d seen worse, he reminded Wisner. Mubarak had been sitting inches away from Sadat on that fateful October day in 1981. He himself had survived six assassination attempts. In fact, he said he intended to go on television again that

he phone call on a Thursday, late in the afternoon, and within a few hours he was on a plane. It was an unusual request from the White House and from the State Department - and though he was a man who had lived a life of many unusual requests, he knew that this one had a certain significance, a weight you might say, if

ly orchestrated by Di. Kissinger, who managed to create enough distance between the Unit- ed States and Israel to allow some negotiating room. Mr. Sadat felt confident enough as the "hero of the crossing" to make his famous trip to Jerusalem. Even the terrorist group of the day, the Palestine Libe

withdrawal of US. troops. "Baghdad is worse to- day than it was three years ago." he said, adding. All of the information .. from the Pentagon and the State Department isn't always true." Really? The voters already had figured that out. According to a poll conducted for CNN this month by Opinion Research Corp. 6

Middle East and North Africa. One response that is often heard is a note of cautious optimism, captured in US President Barack Obama recent speech at the State Department when he referred to the "promise of the future." But sometimes we also hear the populist smears that have been applied to the Middle East for so long

d in an unprecedented phase of strong bilateral cooperation between the two former enemies, but it was also a major cause of the unpopularity of both Sadat and Mubarak. Israel benefited from the cold peace by neutralizing the most powerful conventional force in the Arab world. It even coordinated closely