Epstein Secrets

f of Egypt's General Intelligence Directorate, Salah Nasr, was convinced that the American Embassy in Cairo was behind the jokes going around about Nasser, by then the president. The directorate assigned dozens of offices throughout Egypt to collect the jokes and study their meaning. These were writte

tional security policy. The US-Saudi relationship remains a critical element in the kingdom's foreign policy despite differences over Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and Iran in the last year. Abdullah and Salman do not want to see further bumps in the American-Saudi partne

ourselves with the Soviet Union... We are ready to offer facilities to the Soviet fleet from Port Said to Salloum and from al-Arish to Gaza." With Nasser's death in September 1970, and the inauguration of Anwar Sadat as Egyptian President, the Soviet-Egyptian relationship quickly deteriorated. The KG

r, go deeper and are more complex. At their heart is Iran's interference in internal Arab affairs, particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain. Although Iranian-Saudi enmity dates back many decades, it became acute after the 1979 Islamic Revolution when Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruh

ates in Cairo, innovative ideas were in short supply as nostalgia prevailed. There was talk about the villa on Hishmet Street in Zamalek from where Nasser's Egypt supported African liberation movements and leaders. Some participants proposed reverting to older policies and instruments: refusing foreig

an aspect did not rest there. While Tehran responded positively, several Arab countries in the Gulf, already in bitter confrontation with Iran over Bahrain, felt that the new minister's timing was off. In Cairo, experts supported an opening with EFTA_R1_02029429 EFTA02689780 7 Iran, as it would all

ates in Cairo, innovative ideas were in short supply as nostalgia prevailed. There was talk about the villa on Hishmet Street in Zamalek from where Nasser's Egypt supported African liberation movements and leaders. Some participants proposed reverting to older policies and instruments: refusing foreig

an aspect did not rest there. While Tehran responded positively, several Arab countries in the Gulf, already in bitter confrontation with Iran over Bahrain, felt that the new minister's timing was off. In Cairo, experts supported an opening with EFTA_R1_02029495 EFTA02689823 7 Iran, as it would all

ates in Cairo, innovative ideas were in short supply as nostalgia prevailed. There was talk about the villa on Hishmet Street in Zamalek from where Nasser's Egypt supported African liberation movements and leaders. Some participants proposed reverting to older policies and instruments: refusing foreig

an aspect did not rest there. While Tehran responded positively, several Arab countries in the Gulf, already in bitter confrontation with Iran over Bahrain, felt that the new minister's timing was off. In Cairo, experts supported an opening with EFTA_R1_02030835 EFTA02690481 7 Iran, as it would all

A. Cook is Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square. He blogs at From the Potomac to the Euphrates. Asharq Al-Awsat Gaza tunnel trade: Matter of life and death for Hamas Kifah Zabo

s the first battle in what is going to be a long, bloody conflict that will know no frontiers or limits. Ongoing disorders in the island kingdom of Bahrain since February 2011 have set off alarm bells in Riyadh. The Saudis are convinced that Iran is directing the protests and fear that the problems wil

about that outcome. The Israelis are always opposed to the rising regional force. When that was Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, they focused on Nasser. When it was al Qaeda and its sympathizers, they focused on al Qaeda. When it was Iran, they focused on Tehran. But simple opposition to a regiona

91 has had a huge military presence in the Middle East, with military bases at times in Saudi Arabia and the UAE not to mention the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, all within easy striking distance. 2001's Operation Enduring Freedom saw huge numbers of American troops gathered on Iran's eastern border in Afgh

ates in Cairo, innovative ideas were in short supply as nostalgia prevailed. There was talk about the villa on Hishmet Street in Zamalek from where Nasser's Egypt supported African liberation movements and leaders. Some participants proposed reverting to older policies and instruments: refusing foreig

an aspect did not rest there. While Tehran responded positively, several Arab countries in the Gulf, already in bitter confrontation with Iran over Bahrain, felt that the new minister's timing was off. In Cairo, experts supported an opening with EFTA00584769 7 Iran, as it would allow Egyptian diplom

nse often seemed like a giant game of whack-a-mole, with a new problem popping up daily, was inevitable. And so was the variety of U.S. responses. In Bahrain, where the United States had established the headquarters of the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet, and in Yemen, where counterterrorism is king, interests trump

s. The first three military coups that followed Syrian independence were engineered by Sunni officers. This was followed by the disastrous union with Nasser's Egypt in 1958 when Baath party leaders, following their pan-Arabist nationalist logic, merged their country's identity into that of their more powe