Epstein Secrets

at even if Israel withdrew to the 1967 lines, all Hamas would offer in return is a long-term truce. But that's not essential now either. After all, Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud Party officially opposes the two-state solution too. Israel and America really need three things from Hamas right now. First, a ceasefire. W

sentially banned. And as part of such a deal, Egypt would likely open its border with Gaza, which would ease Hamas's isolation from the world. The Netanyahu government opposes a Palestinian unity deal and negotiations with Hamas. But some former top Israeli security officials disagree. And while it woul

ons and the Israelis. This was confirmed by Egypt's president on Saturday. With the approach of the Israeli elections, the Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, wanted to trade with the blood of the Palestinians, especially after his alliance with the ultra- extremist Avigdor Lieberman failed to boost his p

me to power, Mursi's government has dealt with diplomatic norms in a civilized and harmonious manner, and has shown its commitment to the legacy of the Camp David Accords and other agreements. In this respect, it has outdone any previous government. President Mursi has closed the tunnels that were used to smuggle ar

he White House turn if it wants some kind of peace process in the Middle East? Syria. After all, in his first term as prime minister, back in 1998, Benjamin Netanyahu did authorize indirect negotiations with Syria. And the IDF—and especially Ehud Barak, a former head of the IDF, Israel's defense minister, and a c

direct negotiations with Syria. And the IDF—and especially Ehud Barak, a former head of the IDF, Israel's defense minister, and a close adviser to Netanyahu—has long favored such a deal. The IDF theory was that if Syria made peace, so would Lebanon, and then Israel would be at EFTA_R1_02029152 EFTA0268

even limited military force, its survival was guaranteed. That is, so long as no great power was opposed to its existence. From its founding until the Camp David Accords re-established the Sinai as a buffer with Egypt, Israel's strategic problem was this: So long as Egypt was in the Sinai, Israel's national security

n 10,000 civilians, but a prime strategic interest of Israel and the United States. So why are both the Obama administration and the government of Benjamin Netanyahu unethusiastic — to say the least — about even indirect military intervention to topple Assad? In part it's because of worry about what would follow

tlingly generous offer a falling Olmert made in late 2008, nothing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can offer will elicit a yes. This would leave Netanyahu facing two alternatives: continue economic and institutional development in the West Bank without talks, or undertake a Sharon/Olmert/Mofaz move in

or George H. W. Bush, the two most recent one-term Presidents, who were both defeated despite some notable—even historic—accomplishments, including the Camp David Accords, under Carter, and the Gulf War, under Bush. The country remains closely divided, and the economy is teetering again. After several months of rela