Epstein Secrets

d his belief that a two-state solution is the best way to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The next day, he met with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who rejected several of Obama's assertions and lectured him about what "Israel expects" from its great power patron. Then Obama felt it was smart

ntire diplomacy of freedom, were projects of folly—romantic, self deluding undertakings in the Arab world. To the extent that these men thought of the Greater Middle East, they entered it through the gateway of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. The key to the American security dilemma in the region, they maintained,

d his belief that a two-state solution is the best way to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The next day, he met with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who rejected several of Obama's assertions and lectured him about what "Israel expects" from its great power patron. Then Obama felt it was smart

ntire diplomacy of freedom, were projects of folly—romantic, self deluding undertakings in the Arab world. To the extent that these men thought of the Greater Middle East, they entered it through the gateway of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. The key to the American security dilemma in the region, they maintained,

d his belief that a two-state solution is the best way to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The next day, he met with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who rejected several of Obama's assertions and lectured him about what "Israel expects" from its great power patron. Then Obama felt it was smart

ntire diplomacy of freedom, were projects of folly—romantic, self deluding undertakings in the Arab world. To the extent that these men thought of the Greater Middle East, they entered it through the gateway of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. The key to the American security dilemma in the region, they maintained,

d his belief that a two-state solution is the best way to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The next day, he met with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who rejected several of Obama's assertions and lectured him about what "Israel expects" from its great power patron. Then Obama felt it was smart

ntire diplomacy of freedom, were projects of folly—romantic, self deluding undertakings in the Arab world. To the extent that these men thought of the Greater Middle East, they entered it through the gateway of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. The key to the American security dilemma in the region, they maintained,

ould serve their purpose: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's far-right government may sense weakness and qui

g the peace process to sink into a prolonged coma. Israeli hard-liners, too, may calculate that a short war could serve their purpose: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's far-right government may sense weakness and quietly dream of finishing off Hamas once and for all. Syria has been a strong supporter of Hamas and h

f the Middle East peace process. It has allowed the U.S.-Turkey relationship to reach historic lows, just as Turkey is becoming a formidable actor in the Greater Middle East. By concentrating on health care for its first two years, the administration, and the large majorities in Congress, missed a crucial opportunity to p