Epstein Secrets

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. I 1 th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowin

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing