Epstein Secrets

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

er agent's cellular telephone. Although both the defendant and the agent were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or intend that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Elevent

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

er agent's cellular telephone. Although both the defendant and the agent were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or intend that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Elevent

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

ver agent's cellular telephone. Although both the defendant and the agent were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or intend that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Eleven

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

er agent's cellular telephone. Although both the defendant and the agent were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or intend that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Elevent

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

er agent's cellular telephone. Although both the defendant and the agent were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or intend that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Elevent

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

er agent's cellular telephone. Although both the defendant and the agent were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or intend that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Elevent