Epstein Secrets

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

g, or coercing a person under eighteen years of age in the commission of a drug offense). In United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed a defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution. The N

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

, or coercing a person under eighteen years of age in the commission of a drug offense). In United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed a defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution. The N

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

, or coercing a person under eighteen years of age in the commission of a drug offense). In United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed a defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution. The N

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

, or coercing a person under eighteen years of age in the commission of a drug offense). In United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed a defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution. The N

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

, or coercing a person under eighteen years of age in the commission of a drug offense). In United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed a defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution. The N

simply subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an

, or coercing a person under eighteen years of age in the commission of a drug offense). In United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed a defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution. The N

for Jeff. The victim agreed and arrangements were made to.1 the victim to Epstein's house on a weekend. stated that she and (Later identified as Figueroa) picked up the victim at the victim's house. They traveled to E ns House and entered through the kitchen door. They met with the house chef and Eps

t reasonableness scrutiny"). In the context of the seizure for off-site review of intermingled computerized evidence pursuant to a search warrant, the Ninth Circuit recently stated: In the case of a lawful and reasonable seizure of intermingled computer records for off- site review, . . . our precedents and the