Epstein Secrets

stead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give

ims’ advocates began to argue that the victims themselves had been overlooked. The movement gained great visibility in the early 1980s when President Ronald Reagan appointed the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime.” The Task Force published a report concluding that “the criminal justice system has lost an

sibility in the early 1980s when President Ronald Reagan appointed the President’s Task Force on Victims o

bstantive discussion of whether CVRA rights apply in criminal cases before the filing of charges. Instead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give victims any rights against defendants until those defendants have been convicted'!’—a holding clearl

stead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give

s' advocates began to argue that the victims themselves had been overlooked. * The movement gained great visibility in the early 1980s when President Ronald Reagan appointed the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime. ? The Task Force published a report concluding that "the criminal justice system has lost a

sibility in the early 1980s when President Ronald Reagan appointed the President's Task Force on Victims o

"the CVRA does not grant victims any rights against individuals who have not been convicted of a crime. W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005))). (quoting Jn re 3 Of course, a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution as part of his sentence until he has been found guilty. See /

bstantive discussion of whether CVRA rights apply in criminal cases before the filing of charges. Instead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give victims any rights against defendants until those defendants have been convicted !!* - a holding cle

on. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); see also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2001). Evidence is "material" in this sense only if "its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of a trial." United States v. Bagley, 473

material." United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing cases). With regard to the timing of disclosing material under Giglio, the Second Circuit, in Coppa, rejected the argument that such material should be disclosed when defendants make a 7 EFTA00027318 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:19-cr-0

argument regarding selective prosecution before a jury because the "selective prosecution defense is an issue for the court rather than the jury." Regan, 103 F.3d at 1082. The Second Circuit's directive makes sense. A claim of improper prosecutorial motive, whatever its ground or grounds, "is not a d

on. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); see also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2001). Evidence is "material" in this sense only if "its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of a trial." United States v. Bagley, 473

material." United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing cases). With regard to the timing of disclosing material under Giglio, the Second Circuit, in Coppa, rejected the argument that such material should be disclosed when defendants make a 7 EFTA00031274 --- PAGE BREAK --- demand for it.

argument regarding selective prosecution before a jury because the "selective prosecution defense is an issue for the court rather than the jury." Regan, 103 F.3d at 1082. The Second Circuit's directive makes sense. A claim of improper prosecutorial motive, whatever its ground or grounds, "is not a d

me that the defendant will have a reasonable opportunity to act upon the information efficaciously." United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2007). Immediate disclosure of such material is not warranted simply because the defendant prefers it. See, e.g., United States v. Wey, 15 Cr. 611

coconspirators that the Government planned to offer at trial as admissions of a defendant" under Fed. R. Evid. 801); United States ex rel. Lucas v. Regan, 503 F.2d 1, 3 n.I (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267, 1268-69 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 13