Epstein Secrets

g, and countries are diversifying their natural gas supplies to reduce dependence on the company notorious for its stranglehold on foreign markets. The European Union, in fact, is set to charge Gazprom with "abusing its dominant position in central and eastern Europe" following an aggressive antitrust investigati

re to become an energy hub for transporting non-Russian gas to Europe. Cyprus and Russia formed close defense ties in the 1990s, and Moscow rejects Ankara's claim to North Cyprus in the conflict over the island. Ankara and Nicosia have yet to delineate a maritime boundary, so Turkish attempts to explo

policy may have run its course. Once election season is over, Turkey is likely to rediscover the importance of engaging with the United States and the European Union. Well into the 1990s, Turkey did not really have a foreign policy. Instead, it had an orientation, or what analysts have in mind when they speak of

following months, especially in the wake of Turkey's response to the Mavi Marmara incident, a number of U.S. congressmen withdrew their support for Ankara on important policy issues. For example, Anthony Weiner (D-N.Y.) argued that Turkey's membership in NATO should be "called into question," while Sh

inching toward exploration of an estimated 230 billion cubic meters of gas in Cypriot waters. It is the same Cyprus that is preparing to take over the European Union's term presidency. It is the same EU which Turkey has isolated itself from, most recently due to an Armenian genocide denial bill. And it is the same

Mavi Marmara raid in which Israeli commandos killed eight Turks and one Turkish-American in May 2010, the events have not exactly taken the route Ankara wished them to take. A well-deserved apology for the Israeli fiasco and the unnecessary loss of life has never arrived. Nor has compensation for t

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spread. If it remains, the hopes for a European role in a final peace deal will be dashed. European animosity toward Israel goes beyond the public. The European Union recently adopted guidelines forbidding its agencies to send money to Israeli companies and organizations in the West Bank; this and other similar s

li nuclear weapon. As for the Sunni-Shiite arms race, the critical reaction to an international agreement would be not in Washington but in Cairo, Ankara and Riyadh. Even if the Western powers express confidence in Iran's commitment and pledge a vigorous economic and military response to any Iranian

inching toward exploration of an estimated 230 billion cubic meters of gas in Cypriot waters. It is the same Cyprus that is preparing to take over the European Union's term presidency. It is the same EU which Turkey has isolated itself from, most recently due to an Armenian genocide denial bill. And it is the same

e Mavi Marmara raid in which Israeli commandos killed eight Turks and one Turkish-American in May 2010, the events have not exactly taken the route Ankara wished them to take. A well-deserved apology for the Israeli fiasco and the unnecessary loss of life has never arrived. Nor has compensation for th

he group for the attack in Burgas. Europe must now act collectively and respond resolutely to this attack within its borders by adding Hezbollah to the European Union's terrorist list. That is the next step toward ensuring that Burgas is the last successful Hezbollah operation on European soil. Thomas E. Donilon i

ing Afghanistan and Iraq and for killing and wounding over a million people." Conversations with senior Turkish political operatives familiar with Ankara's political culture and negotiating style suggest a three-part explanation: frustration with the long EU accession process, bluffing, and the need