Epstein Secrets

sumption which, following the =efection of Edward Snowden to Russia, is hard to make prudently—t=en the in

ations =rom Russia. If one assumes that the Russians do not know that the =hannel is being monitored—an assumption which, following the =efection of Edward Snowden to Russia, is hard to make prudently—t=en the intelligence gleaned from that channel can reveal the =remlin's activities and motive. If, however, i

so =se a knowntapped phone line to its advantage. Consider, for =xample, the tapped phone of Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak. On =ecember 1, 2016, Kislyak went to Trump Tower to meet Jared Kushner and =ichael Flynn. According to Kushner's version of that meeting, =islyak suggested that Russian generals

y wanted to help =rump win the election, why did Russian sources provide damaging dirt to =teele, which could have cost Trump the election? Why did Kislyak =rovide the FBI with information, via a known tapped line, that could =and did) compromise key members of Trump's =dministration? 2 EFTA_R1_018719

ence community’s unambiguous assessment of Edward Snowden as a betrayer of national secrets rather than a w

their horror of Donald Trump. Much of the left—which had resoundingly and scathingly rejected the intelligence community’s unambiguous assessment of Edward Snowden as a betrayer of national secrets rather than a well-intentioned whistle-blower—now suddenly embraced the intelligence community’s authority in its s

ns against the Russians, an assurance Pence publicly repeated. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019955 Yates now told the White House that Flynn’s conversation with Kislyak had actually been captured as part of an “incidental collection” of authorized wiretaps. That is, a wiretap had presumably been authorized on the Rus

ared the next day under three other bylines—indicating that DeYoung’s interview was hardly the point of the story—contained new leaked details of the Kislyak phone call, which the Post now said had indeed dealt with the issue of sanctions. The article also contained Flynn’s denial—‘he twice said ‘no’ ”—as

sumption which, following the defection of Edward Snowden to Russia, is hard to make prudently—then the int

cations from Russia. If one assumes that the Russians do not know that the channel is being monitored—an assumption which, following the defection of Edward Snowden to Russia, is hard to make prudently—then the intelligence gleaned from that channel can reveal the Kremlin’s activities and motive. If, however, it

lso use a knowntapped phone line to its advantage. Consider, for example, the tapped phone of Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak. On December 1, 2016, Kislyak went to Trump Tower to meet Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn. According to Kushner’s version of that meeting, Kislyak suggested that Russian generals