Epstein Secrets

insights. Through the eyes of the KGB, a penetration of American intelligence was clearly opportunistic. If these practices continued, they put the Snowden case in a new light for me. If Russian intelligence considered it worthwhile to send an ex-civilian worker at the NSA, such as Ronald Pelton, from Wa

ebruary 19, 2015 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020402 21 CHAPTER THIRTEEN Enter Assange 1. “Thanks to Russia ...”--Julian Assange, “How 'The Guardian' Milked Edward Snowden's Story,” Newsweek, April 20, 2015 “Julian Assange had made...”-- David Leigh and Luke Harding, “Julian Assange: the teen hacker who became insurgent

hor’s Interview with former CIA officer who requested anonymity (Hereinafter Source E.) 3. “The only person there to...”—Mavanee Anderson interview, “Edward Snowden's Friend Mavanee Anderson Exclusive Interview,” MSNBC,’Last Word,” www.youtube.com/watch?v=beQUMdolBWE 4. “He received an unfavorable evaluation,,,”—Er

of evidence is...” —Carl Sagan, Cosmos (Random House, New York) 1980. P. 49 15. “We have many notable cases...” For the cases of Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames, see Appendix A 16. “The greatest trick the...”—Author’s interview with Victor Cherkashin. The quote from Zhe Usual Suspects was adopted by the movi

led comprehensively, and each level of oversight, each level of re- sponsibility that should have addressed this, abdicated their re- sponsibility. —EDWARD SNOWDEN, Moscow, 2013 Wi SNOWDEN in Hong Kong was attempting to reel in the journalists, Lindsay Mills returned to Honolulu from her “island-hopping” trip t

as attempting to reel in the journalists, Lindsay Mills returned to Honolulu from her “island-hopping” trip to find their house partially flooded and Snowden nowhere to be found. In a brief note Snowden left her, he said he was away on a business trip and indicated that, at least tem- porarily, their eight

n moles eluded long, intensive investigations. Rob- ert Hanssen penetrated the FBI for over twenty years for the KGB without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames acted as a KGB mole @ in the CIA for more than ten years and passed all the CIA’s sophisti- @ cated lie detector tests. Both Hanssen and Ames eluded

entation of more sophisticated secu- rity procedures, such as the polygraph examination and extensive background checks. In 1995, eleven years before Snowden joined it, the CIA’s inspector general completed a study of the KGB’s use of false defectors to mislead the U.S. government from the end of the Cold

sses of a nation’s potential adversaries. The most impor- tant of these in peacetime is communication intercepts. It was just such state secrets that Edward Snowden took from the NSA in the spring of 2013. Before that breach, America’s paramount advantage in this subterranean competition was its undisputed domina

TO SNOWDEN’S THEFT of NSA documents, the single most shattering blow to the confidence of the U.S. intelligence com- munity was the 1994 exposure of Aldrich Ames as a long-serving Russian mole in the CIA. Ames, it will be recalled, had been a high- ranking CIA officer, working at the CIA’s Counterintelligence

101 Even though Snowden had greatly exaggerated the positions he held with the CIA and DIA, no effort was made to check them by the team of journalists. Instead, MacAskill w

t does those sorts of things.” He had succeeded in defining himself for the public. The Guardian story accompanying the video carried the headline, “EDWARD SNOWDEN: THE WHISTLE BLOWER BEHIND THE NSA SURVEILLANCE REVELATIONS.” Snowden’s identity as a whistle-blower was now established in the media. Overnight, Sno

d intensive investigations for many decades. Robert Hanssen served as a KGB penetration in the FBI for over 20 years without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames, acted as a KGB mole in the CIA for more than ten years, and passed all the CIA’s sophisticated lie detector tests. Both Hanssen and Ames eluded inte