Epstein Secrets

-- A couple of weeks ago, Americans were treated to a remarkably clear demonstration of the power of the Israel lobby in the United States. First, Barack Obama gave a speech on Middle East policy at the State Department, which tried to position America as a supporter of the Arab spring and reiterated his b

ion is the best way to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The next day, he met with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who rejected several of Obama's assertions and lectured him about what "Israel expects" from its great power patron. Then Obama felt it was smart politics to go to AIPAC and cla

en by presidential candidate Barack Obama that a President Obama would liquidate the American military role in Ir

of the Israel lobby in the United States. First, Barack Obama gave a speech on Middle East policy at the

nse to discreet Gulf suggestions that ex-president Hosni Mubarak should be treated more leniently? In a hastily arranged Gulf trip, Prime Minister Sharaf reassured his hosts that "Gulf security was a red line for Egypt" and that the opening with Tehran would not be at the expense of relations with Gu

Egyptian- Israeli Peace Treaty. Later, criticism of the two Egyptian governments formed after the revolution (one led by Ahmed Shafik, the next by Essam Sharaf) focussed, amongst other things, on retaining a number of the ancien regime ministers in office, including foreign minister Ahmed Abul- Gheit. Abul

en by presidential candidate Barack Obama that a President Obama would liquidate the American military role in Ir

of the Israel lobby in the United States. First, Barack Obama gave a speech on Middle East policy at the

-- A couple of weeks ago, Americans were treated to a remarkably clear demonstration of the power of the Israel lobby in the United States. First, Barack Obama gave a speech on Middle East policy at the State Department, which tried to position America as a supporter of the Arab spring and reiterated his b

ion is the best way to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The next day, he met with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who rejected several of Obama's assertions and lectured him about what "Israel expects" from its great power patron. Then Obama felt it was smart politics to go to AIPAC and cla

Egyptian- Israeli Peace Treaty. Later, criticism of the two Egyptian governments formed after the revolution (one led by Ahmed Shafik, the next by Essam Sharaf) focussed, amongst other things, on retaining a number of the ancien regime ministers in office, including foreign minister Ahmed Abul- Gheit. Abul

nse to discreet Gulf suggestions that ex-president Hosni Mubarak should be treated more leniently? In a hastily arranged Gulf trip, Prime Minister Sharaf reassured his hosts that "Gulf security was a red line for Egypt" and that the opening with Tehran would not be at the expense of relations with Gu

-- A couple of weeks ago, Americans were treated to a remarkably clear demonstration of the power of the Israel lobby in the United States. First, Barack Obama gave a speech on Middle East policy at the State Department, which tried to position America as a supporter of the Arab spring and reiterated his b

ion is the best way to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The next day, he met with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who rejected several of Obama's assertions and lectured him about what "Israel expects" from its great power patron. Then Obama felt it was smart politics to go to AIPAC and cla

en by presidential candidate Barack Obama that a President Obama would liquidate the American military role in Ir

of the Israel lobby in the United States. First, Barack Obama gave a speech on Middle East policy at the

Egyptian- Israeli Peace Treaty. Later, criticism of the two Egyptian governments formed after the revolution (one led by Ahmed Shafik, the next by Essam Sharaf) focussed, amongst other things, on retaining a number of the ancien regime ministers in office, including foreign minister Ahmed Abul- Gheit. Abul

nse to discreet Gulf suggestions that ex-president Hosni Mubarak should be treated more leniently? In a hastily arranged Gulf trip, Prime Minister Sharaf reassured his hosts that "Gulf security was a red line for Egypt" and that the opening with Tehran would not be at the expense of relations with Gu

-- A couple of weeks ago, Americans were treated to a remarkably clear demonstration of the power of the Israel lobby in the United States. First, Barack Obama gave a speech on Middle East policy at the State Department, which tried to position America as a supporter of the Arab spring and reiterated his b

ion is the best way to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The next day, he met with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who rejected several of Obama's assertions and lectured him about what "Israel expects" from its great power patron. Then Obama felt it was smart politics to go to AIPAC and cla

en by presidential candidate Barack Obama that a President Obama would liquidate the American military role in Ir

of the Israel lobby in the United States. First, Barack Obama gave a speech on Middle East policy at the

nse to discreet Gulf suggestions that ex-president Hosni Mubarak should be treated more leniently? In a hastily arranged Gulf trip, Prime Minister Sharaf reassured his hosts that "Gulf security was a red line for Egypt" and that the opening with Tehran would not be at the expense of relations with Gu

Egyptian- Israeli Peace Treaty. Later, criticism of the two Egyptian governments formed after the revolution (one led by Ahmed Shafik, the next by Essam Sharaf) focussed, amongst other things, on retaining a number of the ancien regime ministers in office, including foreign minister Ahmed Abul- Gheit. Abul

judiciary's favorability also remains solid at 76%, reflecting confidence in the judges' efforts to achieve justice and impartiality. US president Barack Obama is viewed favorably by just 12% of Egyptians. Newly-named Al Qaeda leader Ayman al- Zawahiri, a native Egyptian, is rated positively by 11% of his co

an, is rated positively by 11% of his compatriots, while only 5% of them are favorable to Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. "Despite President Obama's words and measures in support of Egypt's revolution he only narrowly edges out the leaders of Al Qaeda and Iran in popular regard there," says Cra

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. "Despite President Obama's words and measures in support of Egypt's revolu

o achieve justice and impartiality. US president Barack Obama is viewed favorably by just 12% of Egyptian

y-General Amr Moussa remains front runner for the November presidential election with 32% of voting intentions. If they run, sitting Prime Minister Essam Sharaf would place second at 16% and Marshall Mohammad Tantawi third at 8%. Opposition leaders Mohammad El Baradei and Ayman Nour get just 2% and 3% of vot

d very far from the peace process. There was nothing that we could build positively on. We look at his speech negatively." (Maan News) US President Barack Obama said on Wednesday that the Palestinians should negotiate with the Israelis and not appeal to the UN for statehood. "The UN can achieve a lot of impo

ng to be able to do is deliver a Palestinian state. The only way to see a Palestinian state is if Palestinians and Israelis agree on a just peace," Obama said in a joint press conference with British Prime Minister David Cameron in London. (Reuters) EU foreign policy Chief Catherine Ashton reiterated

his speech negatively." (Maan News) US President Barack Obama said on Wednesday that the Palestinians sho

ers) The Muslim Brotherhood announced in a statement that it will not participate in the Friday protests. (Al-Ahram, Egypt) Egypt's Prime Minister Essam Sharaf promoted his interim government's achievements on Wednesday. He appealed to Egyptians to give his government time to meet their demands. (Egyptian T

eapons capability — citing what he said was a new American intelligence report — there is no proof that Iran is at the point of producing a weapon. Obama administration officials would not confirm the existence of such a report, and, in any case, continue to insist strongly that Iran is not on the v

ecree. The circumstances are, of course, quite different, but the dismissals of Muwafi, Enan, and Tantawi evoke the jettisoning of Sabri, Sharawi, Sharaf, and Fawzi a little more than 41 years ago. It is hard to draw any conclusion just yet about Egypt's strategic orientation, but it may look more li