Epstein Secrets

owden breach. Despite the immense potential damage of the theft, it was not until June 10 that the CIA’s director, John Owen Brennan, and his deputy, Michael Morell, were briefed by the NSA. When Morell realized how much data Snowden had taken, he was astounded. “You might have thought of all the government enti

are deemed “dan- gles,” or agents dispatched by the KGB to test and confuse the CIA. @ Others are rejected as political liabilities, as happened to Wang Lijun, @ a well-connected police chief in China. In February 2012, Wang walked into the U.S. consulate in Chengdu asking for asylum. The State Department d

rk zone where there are just so many dan- gerous things going on.” The effects of Snowden’s intervention were soon realized by the CIA, according to Michael Morell, who had closely followed intel- ligence about terrorist groups in the Middle East ever since he had acted as the CIA’s briefer for the president on

“NSA Inspector General Speaks on Snowden for First Time,” Shadow Proof, Feb. 25, 2014. 157 KGB major Anatoliy Golitsyn: Bagley, Spy Wars, 6-11. 158 Wang Lijun: Steven Lee Myers and Mark Landler, “Frenzied Hours for U.S. on Fate of a China Insider,” New York Times, April 17, 2012. 159 “I think Snowden is”:

by Russia to block secret sources of NSA surveillance. “Within weeks of the [Snowden] leaks, communications sources dried up, tactics were changed,” Michael Morell who was at that time the Deputy Director of the CIA, revealed. It indicated that at least part of the US communications intelligence that Snowden had

agents dispatched by the KGB to test and HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020278 (27 confuse the CIA. Others are rejected as political liabilities, as happened to Wang Lijun, a well- connected police chief in China. In February 2012, Wang, walked into at the US consulate in Chengdu asking from asylum. The State Department