Epstein Secrets

joined the ranks of the many contractors working @ in the intelligence community [IC] before CIA could inform the rest of the IC about its worries,” Michael Morell, then CIA deputy direc- tor, explained. “He even got a pay raise.” Obviously, this was a glitch in the security system. As a result of it, though, S

ing records for ninety days to the NSA. It was as close to a smoking gun as anything he had copied at the NSA. It would also get atten- tion because James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, had stated before Congress just two months earlier that the NSA did not collect phone data in America. This w

ier that the NSA did not collect phone data in America. This warrant would allow The Guard- ian, in the best tradition of gotcha journalism, to catch Clapper in an apparent lie. Continuing his string pulling, Snowden instructed Poitras not to show the FISA warrant to Greenwald until they were safely aboar

owden breach. Despite the immense potential damage of the theft, it was not until June 10 that the CIA’s director, John Owen Brennan, and his deputy, Michael Morell, were briefed by the NSA. When Morell realized how much data Snowden had taken, he was astounded. “You might have thought of all the government enti

Snowden supporters, described the NSA activities exposed by Snowden as part of a vast criminal conspiracy involv- ing, among others, President Obama, James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, and both Democratic and Republican members of the congressional oversight committees. It further derided any

VERSIGHT_019617 130 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS per answered that the NSA did not knowingly “collect any type of data” on millions of Americans. Clapper’s answer was clearly untrue, but it did not mislead Senator Wyden or any other members of the Senate Intelligence Committee; Clapper had truthfully t

rk zone where there are just so many dan- gerous things going on.” The effects of Snowden’s intervention were soon realized by the CIA, according to Michael Morell, who had closely followed intel- ligence about terrorist groups in the Middle East ever since he had acted as the CIA’s briefer for the president on

vey Oswald (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 64-104. 129 Clapper answered that: The transcript was published by The Washington Post, Jan. 29, 2014. For Clapper’s earlier closed-door testimony, see Steven Aftergood, “The Clapper ‘Lie’ and the Senate Intelligence Committee,” FAS, Jan. 6, 2014. 130 On his appl

vernment, and defected to Russia. See Edward Jay Epstein, Legend: The Secret World of Lee Har- vey Oswald (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 64-104. 129 Clapper answered that: The transcript was published by The Washington Post, Jan. 29, 2014. For Clapper’s earlier closed-door testimony, see Steven Aftergood,

by Russia to block secret sources of NSA surveillance. “Within weeks of the [Snowden] leaks, communications sources dried up, tactics were changed,” Michael Morell who was at that time the Deputy Director of the CIA, revealed. It indicated that at least part of the US communications intelligence that Snowden had

NSA “There are many things we do in intelligence that, if revealed, would have the potential for all kinds of blowback,” -- National Intelligence” — James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence In the Game of Nations, which is played at a level that often is not visible to public scrutiny, the great prize