Epstein Secrets

owden breach. Despite the immense potential damage of the theft, it was not until June 10 that the CIA’s director, John Owen Brennan, and his deputy, Michael Morell, were briefed by the NSA. When Morell realized how much data Snowden had taken, he was astounded. “You might have thought of all the government enti

am headed by Richard “Rick” Ledgett, who was then director of the NSA’s Threat Opera- tions Center at the NSA’s headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland. Ledgett was the logical choice to head the damage assessment inves- tigation because the center’s regional branch in Hawaii was under his command. Ledgett fl

n camera in his Hong Kong interview in June 2013 that NSA investi- gators would have “a heart attack” when they discovered the extent of the breach. Ledgett, the NSA official who had conducted the damage assess- ment, while not having a heart attack, confirmed that Snowden had taken a massive number of do

rk zone where there are just so many dan- gerous things going on.” The effects of Snowden’s intervention were soon realized by the CIA, according to Michael Morell, who had closely followed intel- ligence about terrorist groups in the Middle East ever since he had acted as the CIA’s briefer for the president on

es to Russia.” 41 Physical Phatness: Lindsay Mills’s Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com /lindsay.mills.90/about. 42. the first known document: Ledgett revealed this in an interview with Vanity Fair. Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden Saga.” 42 “He stole the [NSA] test”: Snowden’s obtaining th

“I, Spy.” “was moving copies of that data”: Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden Saga.” 45 he later pointed out: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.” 45 Ledgett subsequently reported: Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden Saga.” 45 This theft was made: Michael Hayden, interview with author. 46 “Icrossed

joined the ranks of the many contractors working @ in the intelligence community [IC] before CIA could inform the rest of the IC about its worries,” Michael Morell, then CIA deputy direc- tor, explained. “He even got a pay raise.” Obviously, this was a glitch in the security system. As a result of it, though, S

ell was transferring files held at Fort Meade to backup computers in Hawaii. He “was moving copies of that data there for them,” said Deputy Director Ledgett, “which was perfect cover for stealing the [NSA] data” through the fall and winter of 2012. The security mea- sures at the Hawaii base presented no o

by Russia to block secret sources of NSA surveillance. “Within weeks of the [Snowden] leaks, communications sources dried up, tactics were changed,” Michael Morell who was at that time the Deputy Director of the CIA, revealed. It indicated that at least part of the US communications intelligence that Snowden had

se “bread crumbs” were missed by the NSA according to its statement. It is within the realm of possibility that the NSA Damage Assessment team under Ledgett falsified its finding to inflate the number of documents that Snowden stole. NSA executives also might have lied to Congress to the same end. But why