Epstein Secrets

owden breach. Despite the immense potential damage of the theft, it was not until June 10 that the CIA’s director, John Owen Brennan, and his deputy, Michael Morell, were briefed by the NSA. When Morell realized how much data Snowden had taken, he was astounded. “You might have thought of all the government enti

nterview with Kucherena was a coup because, until then, he had not discussed Snowden in a television interview. About halfway through the interview, Shevardnadze brought up the highly sensitive subject of the disposition of the NSA docu- ments. If anyone was in a position to know about these documents, it was

rk zone where there are just so many dan- gerous things going on.” The effects of Snowden’s intervention were soon realized by the CIA, according to Michael Morell, who had closely followed intel- ligence about terrorist groups in the Middle East ever since he had acted as the CIA’s briefer for the president on

nce Expert Guilty of Espionage,” Chicago Tribune, June 6, 1986. CHAPTER 26 The Handler 261 “As for [Snowden’s] communication”: Kucherena interview, Shevardnadze, “Snowden Believes He Did Everything Right.” 261 learned from a Russian researcher: Vassili Sonkine, interview with author. 261 When I had been inv

by Russia to block secret sources of NSA surveillance. “Within weeks of the [Snowden] leaks, communications sources dried up, tactics were changed,” Michael Morell who was at that time the Deputy Director of the CIA, revealed. It indicated that at least part of the US communications intelligence that Snowden had

efense was what Snowden did with the second set afer his meetings with the journalists in Hong Kong. Did he take these documents with him to Russia? Shevardnadze, who makes it a point to drill her interviewees, pressed Kucherena as to whether Snowden still had these NSA files, or “material” in Russia. The dial