Epstein Secrets

joined the ranks of the many contractors working @ in the intelligence community [IC] before CIA could inform the rest of the IC about its worries,” Michael Morell, then CIA deputy direc- tor, explained. “He even got a pay raise.” Obviously, this was a glitch in the security system. As a result of it, though, S

en a year earlier, Unfortunately, that room was occupied, but I was given a nearby room that served my purpose. Snowden had told Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras, the Guardian reporters he met in Hong Kong, that he had hidden out at the Mira hotel since his arrival in Hong Kong because he feared that the CIA m

t necessary), Bolivia, and Ecuador. Yet he did not apply for visas during this time period. Even as late as June 8, after meetings with Greenwald and Poitras, his name had still not been revealed, no criminal complaint had been issued against him, and there was no Interpol red alert for his deten- tion. He

owden breach. Despite the immense potential damage of the theft, it was not until June 10 that the CIA’s director, John Owen Brennan, and his deputy, Michael Morell, were briefed by the NSA. When Morell realized how much data Snowden had taken, he was astounded. “You might have thought of all the government enti

ournal. Snowden was certainly aware that he would soon be the object of a manhunt that could involve those with whom he was acquainted. He instructed Poitras to mask their e-mail communications in cyber- space “so we don’t have a clue or record of your true name in your file communication chain.” Such prec

eedoms. Within hours of the release of that video on the Guardian website, Snowden was known throughout the world as a courageous whistle-blower. In Laura Poitras’s remarks in accepting her Academy Award for Citizenfour on February 22, 2015, she said that Snowden acted as a whistle-blower not only to “expose a th

rk zone where there are just so many dan- gerous things going on.” The effects of Snowden’s intervention were soon realized by the CIA, according to Michael Morell, who had closely followed intel- ligence about terrorist groups in the Middle East ever since he had acted as the CIA’s briefer for the president on

vidently did not want to expose himself to prosecution or defect from the NSA. That was Snowden’s role. By accepting the sole blame in the video that Poitras made about him in Hong Kong, Snowden shielded anyone else from suspicion, which was, as he told Poitras, his purpose. Whoever helped him may still be

“Mini Documentary Reveals Full Extent of ‘Stellarwind’ Domestic Spy Program,” Infowars, Aug. 28, 2012. 62 Poitras had other impressive credentials: “Laura Poitras: Secret No Longer,” New School News, Aug. 14, 2013. 63 “I didn’t. You chose yourself”: Snowden’s e-mails to Poitras were extracted from her film Cit

by Russia to block secret sources of NSA surveillance. “Within weeks of the [Snowden] leaks, communications sources dried up, tactics were changed,” Michael Morell who was at that time the Deputy Director of the CIA, revealed. It indicated that at least part of the US communications intelligence that Snowden had

illance Under Obama.” Along with it was the FISA warrant to Verizon. The PRISM story broke hours later in the Washington Post. Written by Gellman and Poitras, it claimed that the NSA and FBI were tapping directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S, Internet companies which were knowingly particip

ding such well known activists as Runa Sandvik (who he supplied his true name and address via email), Micah Lee, Jacob Appelbaum, Parker Higgins, and Laura Poitras. “It is not statistically improbable that members of this circle were being watched by a hostile service,” a former NSA counterintelligence officer t