Epstein Secrets

joined the ranks of the many contractors working @ in the intelligence community [IC] before CIA could inform the rest of the IC about its worries,” Michael Morell, then CIA deputy direc- tor, explained. “He even got a pay raise.” Obviously, this was a glitch in the security system. As a result of it, though, S

d contact with Snowden a year earlier, Unfortunately, that room was occupied, but I was given a nearby room that served my purpose. Snowden had told Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras, the Guardian reporters he met in Hong Kong, that he had hidden out at the Mira hotel since his arrival in Hong Kong because he fea

he later said, she was in charge of their “operational security.” When they finally settled at a table in the nearly empty restau- rant, she showed Greenwald e-mails she had received from Citizen Four. Greenwald, as he recounted, made “no connection” to the “long-forgotten emails” he had received from Snowden

owden breach. Despite the immense potential damage of the theft, it was not until June 10 that the CIA’s director, John Owen Brennan, and his deputy, Michael Morell, were briefed by the NSA. When Morell realized how much data Snowden had taken, he was astounded. “You might have thought of all the government enti

st you try the lounge instead. I’ll offer to show you where it is, @ and at that point we’re good. You simply need to follow naturally.” According to Greenwald’s account, Snowden changed the plan to the upper lobby. “We were to go to the third floor,” Greenwald writes. “We were to wait on a couch near a ‘gia

ty for what would turn out to be the largest theft of top secret documents in the his- tory of U.S. intelligence. In the video, it will be recalled, Glenn Greenwald, who had bro- ken the NSA story in The Guardian, questioned Snowden. What was his motive? Greenwald asked. Why did he do it? Snowden replied that he

rk zone where there are just so many dan- gerous things going on.” The effects of Snowden’s intervention were soon realized by the CIA, according to Michael Morell, who had closely followed intel- ligence about terrorist groups in the Middle East ever since he had acted as the CIA’s briefer for the president on

013 while he was still on the NSA payroll. He also carefully orches- trated the exposure of the PRISM surveillance programs, precisely specifying, as Greenwald writes in his book No Place to Hide, who was to release the “scoops” in which newspapers. He gave Gellman a seventy-two-hour ultimatum for exposing P

. 13, 2013. 138 “Something is not right”: Transcript of interview with Alexander, Australian Financial Review, May 8, 2014. 138 This discovery came: “Glenn Greenwald’s Partner Detained at Heathrow Airport for Nine Hours,” Guardian, Aug. 18, 2013. 139 downloading documents: Ledgett was interviewed in this timeline by

by Russia to block secret sources of NSA surveillance. “Within weeks of the [Snowden] leaks, communications sources dried up, tactics were changed,” Michael Morell who was at that time the Deputy Director of the CIA, revealed. It indicated that at least part of the US communications intelligence that Snowden had

ibson in New York “The Guinness is good.” It was a pre-arranged code by which MacAskill certified Snowden’s credibility for the Guardian. Gibson told Greenwald to proceed with the story. Greenwald wrote his first story about NSA transgression based almost entirely on the FISA watrant that Snowden had copie

evealed to Wizner that she had found an anonymous source with access to U.S. government surveillance secrets. So he was not completely surprised when Glenn Greenwald, Poitras’ writing partner, asked him in July 2013 to contact Snowden in Russia. Snowden offered an opportunity for Wizner since the ACLU already had