Epstein Secrets

oute to producing weapons-grade plutonium in the installation now being built at Arak. Not surprisingly, the Iranian negotiator, upon his return to Tehran, described the agreement as giving Iran its long-claimed right to enrich and, in effect, eliminating the American threat of using force as a last r

ns scheduled for Jan. 21 if the Syrian regime will agree to confidence-building measures such as a humanitarian relief corridor to besieged areas. Idriss didn't demand as a precondition that President Bashar al-Assad resign before negotiations begin. Instead, he said, Assad's departure should come "a

attling al-Qaeda fighters at 24 locations over the past six months and fighting Assad's army. The CIA is said to be training about 200 fighters for Idriss each month, though the commander wouldn't acknowledge this support. Asked about U.S. tactical advice to stage more "hit and run" guerrilla operati

rly cancelled deal for to sell S-300 antiaircraft missiles to Iran had been reactivated, rendering moot a multi-billion dollar lawsuit initiated by Tehran for breach of contract. That much-discussed arms deal, nixed in 2009 during the inaugural days of the "reset" and thought to be an encouraging sign

he U.S.-supplied equipment there, including trucks and food rations (but not weapons, officials say). One spokesman for the FSA told reporters that Idriss' forces surrendered amicably because they weren't strong enough to defend the facility against a threatened attack by more radical jihadists. No ma

n on 25 February in Kazakhstan. What are the prospects of success? In a nutshell, that would seem to depend more on the climate in Washington than in Tehran. Iran is gesturing that it wants to negotiate, but Washington has not yet signalled any greater flexibility than in the past. In a major speech in T

4, he seeks U.S. assistance in “training for: (1) special operations; (2) international humanitarian law; and (3)... in chemical weapons security.” Idriss requested various supplies for these elite units, including: “(1) combat armor; (2) night vision goggles; (3) hand held monocular and longer range sp

n on 25 February in Kazakhstan. What are the prospects of success? In a nutshell, that would seem to depend more on the climate in Washington than in Tehran. Iran is gesturing that it wants to negotiate, but Washington has not yet signalled any greater flexibility than in the past. In a major speech in Te

4, he seeks U.S. assistance in "training for: (1) special operations; (2) international humanitarian law; and (3) ... in chemical weapons security." Idriss requested various supplies for these elite units, including: "(1) combat armor; (2) night vision goggles; (3) hand held monocular and longer range sp