Epstein Secrets

ll the telegrams coming into the United States. “Its far-seeking eyes penetrate the secret conference chambers at Wash- ington, Tokyo, London, Paris, Geneva, Rome,” Yardley wrote about the Black Chamber. “Its sensitive ears catch the faintest whispering in the foreign capitals of the world.” But in 1929,

e entirely hidden, is kept veiled, as far as is possible, to increase the value of the coup. “The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept, the Russian or Chinese intelli- gence service

“The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept, the Russian or Chinese intelli- gence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self- described “single point of failur

of undelivered NSA documents found in his home, @ the investigation was never able to assess the total extent of the KGB penetration of NSA secrets. (Angleton suspected Dunlap was mur- dered by the KGB in what he termed a surreptitiously assisted death, to prevent Dunlap from talking to investigators.) The

ch a security investigation of Snowden but it was aborted when he resigned. He also had incurred large losses speculating in the financial markets in Geneva, which is an activity which had in the past attracted in interest of foreign intelligence services. So it had to be considered in this scenario that

eper program through Poteyev soon after it began. The issue was how to exploit this knowledge. When I was writing my book on international deception, Angleton had pointed out to me that “the business of intelligence services is understanding precisely the relationship of their opposition to them.” His view,

final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence coup, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept the Russian or Chinese intelligence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self-described “single point of failure,”

s of undelivered NSA documents found in his home, the investigation was never able to assess the total extent of the KGB penetration of NSA secrets. (Angleton suspected Dunlap was murdered the KGB, in what he termed a surreptitiously assisted death, to prevent Dunlap from talking to investigators.) The Rus

rveillance revelations,” Guardian, June 9, 2013 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020389 238 CHAPTER FIVE Contractor L 10. 11. 12. 13. “Much of what I saw in Geneva...”-- Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras and Ewen MacAskill, “Edward Snowden: the whistleblower behind the NSA surveillance revelations,” Guardian, June

to life imprisonment. Looking at his watch, Cherkashin politely excused himself, saying he had work to do. On parting, I signed a copy of my book on Angleton for him and thanked him for his insights. Through the eyes of the KGB, a penetration of American intelligence was clearly opportunistic. If these pr

Spy Case.” October 31,2011, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/201 1/october/russian_103111/russian_10311 1 > Author's interview with James Jesus “Angleton had pointed out...’ Angleton. “The situation suddenly changed...”-- Bill Gertz, “Counterspies hunt Russian mole inside National Security Agency,” Wa

elt it, known it, and recognized it. Now realize it. I woke this morning with a new name. That name is ... Wolfking Awesomefox” --Edward Snowden in Geneva, June 12, 2008. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020195 44 CHAPTER THREE Tinker “Tt’s like the boiling frog. You get exposed to a little bit of evil, a little bi

970s for my book on deception that intelligence services play by a different set of rules than historians when it comes to their espionage successes. Angleton, a famously baroque thinker himself, impressed on me the complexity of espionage. He said “It’s not enough just to steal a secret. It must be done in