Epstein Secrets

r example, coefficient ti in Antal et al, 2008). Wild and Traulsen (2007) argue that the general payoff

14 6.2 Mixed games with 2 strategies 119 6.3 Mixed games with two pure strategies 122 6.3.1 A resealed payoff matrix 125 6.3.2 Example: Hawks and Doves 126 6.4 A mixed 3-game: Cooperators, Defectors, Loners 130 6.5 Mixed games with n pure strategies 135 6.6 Conclusion 136 B

eiber 2001, Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Wild and Taylor 2004, Traulsen et al 2005, Antal & Sch

. 0, the mixed phase extends to the quarter-plane a > 0, > 0. For large mutation ratesµ —• co, however, the mixed phase disappears. 6.3.2 Example: Hawks and Doves As an example, we consider the Hawk-Dove game (Maynard-Smith 1982, Houston Mcishunara 1988, Houston Sc McNamara 1991, IvIesterton-Gibbons

enjoy the surroundings. Furthermore, unlike many wild animals, human beings do not usually shake off t

as freezing and feigning death. For example, a mouse freezes when it senses a predator nearby, becoming "as still as a mouse" to avoid detection. Hawks have extremely good eyesight and can pick up the slightest movement, even those of a mouse's normal breathing. If a hawk is cir- cling in a field ov