Epstein Secrets

lves are also the ones most likely to lash out with extreme violence when someone threatens the reality of their stature. The evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers was the first to identify the adaptive significance of self-deception and its connection to deception. As he insightfully notes in his book The Folly

s of victory in war — or any competitive arena. Though this is a costly strategy, there are clear evolutionary benefits under conditions explained by Trivers and Johnson. Self-deception is favored when opponents have imperfect information about their strengths and weaknesses, and where the payoffs are high

ology of bystanders, perpetrators, and heroic helpers. Jn: The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, adults and groups help and harm others, NY, Cambridge University Press, pp. 291-324. Hauser Chapter 4. Wicked in waiting 143 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_012889 Epilogue: Evilightenment Educate your children to self-control, to t

the long run. Am. Nat. 181.451-463. Taylor. P.D.. Jon ker. L. 1978. Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics. Math. Biosa. 40. 145-156. Trivers. R.L. 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quart. Rev. Biol. 46. 35-57. Tucker.A.. 1950.A tyro-person dilemma. In: Rasmussen. E. (Ed.). Read

stable strategies and game dynamics. J. Theoret. Biol. 81.609-612. Hofbauer. J.. Sigmund. K.. 1988. The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical Systems. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge UK. Hofbauer. J.. Sigmund. K.. 1998. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge UK. Kropotkin. P

s on two levels..1 thcor Biol 235: 393-401. 96. Trivers R (2005). Reciprocal altruism: 30 years later. In

4). Quantitative genetic models and changing environments. In Evolutionary Conservation Biology, cds. R Fcrricrc, U Dicckmann, D Couvet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 171-186. 23. Doebeli M, C Haucrt, T Killingback (2004). The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors. Science 306: 859-862. 24. Frank SA

y intensity. B. Math. Biol. 70, 1410-1424. [158] Trivers, R.L., 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism

MA, London, UK. [21] Dieckmann, U., Law, R., Metz, J.A.J., (Eds.), 2000. The Geometry of Ecological In- teractions: Simplifying Spatial Complexity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. [22] Doebeli, M., Knowlton, N., 1998. The evolution of interspecific mutualisms. P. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 95, 8676-8680. [23] D

ard for both sexes. R. A. Fisher in 1930, and Bob Trivers in 1972, suggested why. Males, in humans, produce

first demographic transition”. American Anthropologist, 87(3):650—-653, Sept. 1985. [2] Brian Charlesworth. Evolution in Age-Structured Populations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1980. [3] Ansley J. Coale and Paul Demeny. Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations. Academic Press, New York, 2nd edi

ly applied in biological contexts to explain phenomena such as animal sex ratios (Fisher, 1958), territoriality (Smith & Price, 1973), coop- eration (Trivers, 1971), sexual displays (Zahavi, 1975), and parent—offspring con- flict (Trivers, 1974). More recently, evolutionary dynamic models have been applied

stated preferences. American Economic Review, 94, 741-752. Locke, J. (1988/1688). Locke: Two treatises of government student edition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mankiw, N. G. (2007). Principles of economics. Thomson Learning. Milgrom, P., & Weber, R. J. (1982). The value of information in a sealed-bid auct

mund, Evolutionary games and population dynamics (Cambridge University Press, 1998). [19] M. A. Nowak, Evolutionary dynamics:

-- References 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 R. L. Trivers, Quarterly review of biology pp. 35-57 (1971). J.