Epstein Secrets

l to the percentage of their genes that others carry. This insight was further developed by the concept of parental investment. Ronald Fisher and Robert Trivers (1972) defined it as "any investment by the parent in an individual offspring that increases the offspring's chance of surviving...at the cost of

f parental investment. Ronald Fisher and Robert Trivers (1972) defined it as "any investment by the pare

disease. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med 2006;160:805- I 1. 24. Weiss RS. Loneliness: The experience of emotional and social isolation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1973. 25. Brewer MB, Gardner W. Who is this "we"? Levels of collective identity and self representations. Journal of Personality and Social Ps

of parental investment. Ronald Fisher and Robert Trivers (1972) defined it as “any investment by the paren

p. 101. "William Hamilton, “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior, IT” Journal of Theoretical Biology 7 (1964), pp. 17-52. "Ronald Fisher and Robert Trivers, “Parental Investment and Sexual Selection,” B. Campbell (ed.), Sexual HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_021284 Selection and the Descent of Man (Chicago: Aldine Pub

iovascular disease. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med 2006;160:805-11. Weiss RS. Loneliness: The experience of emotional and social isolation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1973. Brewer MB, Gardner W. Who is this “we”? Levels of collective identity and self representations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

0), 718-723; Sigmund, K., Hauert, C., & Nowak, M. (2001). Reward and punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 989), 10757- 10762; Trivers, R.L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35-57. Quotes Watts, D. P., Muller, M., Amsler, S. J., Mbabazi

so. These ideas started with Charles Darwin. One hundred years later, they were developed in exquisite detail by the American evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers. Combined, they provide an explanation for why, in most species including our own, males compete with each other for access to females — the most val

ociates; Espmark, Y., Amundsen, T., & Rosenqvist,G. (2000). Animal Signals. Tapir Academic Press; Hauser, M.D. (1996) The Evolution of Communication. MIT Press; Krebs, J., & Dawkins, R. (1984). Animal signals: mind-reading and manipulation. In: Behavioural ecology, pp. 380-402, Sinauer Press; Maynard Smith,

lves are also the ones most likely to lash out with extreme violence when someone threatens the reality of their stature. The evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers was the first to identify the adaptive significance of self-deception and its connection to deception. As he insightfully notes in his book The Folly

s of victory in war — or any competitive arena. Though this is a costly strategy, there are clear evolutionary benefits under conditions explained by Trivers and Johnson. Self-deception is favored when opponents have imperfect information about their strengths and weaknesses, and where the payoffs are high

R. & Dennett, D. (2009) The evolution of misbelief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences vol. 32 pp. 493-561; Hirstein, W. (2005) Brain Fiction, Cambridge, MIT Press. * iHuman: Bastian, B., Laham, $.M, Wilson, S., Haslam, N., & Koval, P. (2011). Blaming, praising, and protecting our humanity: The implications of

the long run. Am. Nat. 181.451-463. Taylor. P.D.. Jon ker. L. 1978. Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics. Math. Biosa. 40. 145-156. Trivers. R.L. 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quart. Rev. Biol. 46. 35-57. Tucker.A.. 1950.A tyro-person dilemma. In: Rasmussen. E. (Ed.). Read

on of Cooperation. Basic Books. New York. NY. Revised edition published in 2006. Cressman. R. 2005. Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games. MIT Press. Cambridge. Massachusetts. De Jaegher. K.. 2017. Harsh environments and the evolution of multi-player coop- eration. Theor. Popul. Biol. 113. 1-12.

rmalizes a simple intuition first spelled out by Trivers (I): One can imagine. for example. compensating

061 Evolvtionary Lynam.= &profile the Equations of Lob (Harvard UMW Press. Cambridge. MA). 19. Fudenberg DA (1996) The Theory of Learning in Gamer (MIT Press. Cambridge. MAL Vol 2. 20. Batson CD (2014) The Aftnai.vn Question: reword s Sociol.esychologioif Answer (Psychology Press. Hew York/ 21. And eon

y intensity. B. Math. Biol. 70, 1410-1424. [158] Trivers, R.L., 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism

, Hamilton, W.D., 1981. The evolution of cooperation. Science 211, 1390- 1396. [7] [8] [9] Binmore, K., 1994. Game Theory and the Social Contract. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. [10] Binniore, K. 2007. Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory. Oxford University Press. [11] Boerlijst, M.C., Hogeweg, P., 1991

ly applied in biological contexts to explain phenomena such as animal sex ratios (Fisher, 1958), territoriality (Smith & Price, 1973), coop- eration (Trivers, 1971), sexual displays (Zahavi, 1975), and parent—offspring con- flict (Trivers, 1974). More recently, evolutionary dynamic models have been applied

Killing, letting die, and the trolley problem. The Monist, 59(2), 204-217. Tirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Trivers, R. (2011). The folly of fools: The logic of deceit and self-deception in human life. New York: Basic Books. Trivers, R. L. (1971). The ev