Epstein Secrets

0), 718-723; Sigmund, K., Hauert, C., & Nowak, M. (2001). Reward and punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 989), 10757- 10762; Trivers, R.L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35-57. Quotes Watts, D. P., Muller, M., Amsler, S. J., Mbabazi

so. These ideas started with Charles Darwin. One hundred years later, they were developed in exquisite detail by the American evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers. Combined, they provide an explanation for why, in most species including our own, males compete with each other for access to females — the most val

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ch. In this case, cooperation yields the higher payoff only when one's partner also cooperates. The Hawk-Dove game (May- nard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1978) represents the fourth kind, in which having a different behavior than one's partner produces a higher payoff. Doves cooperate by sharing res

ly applied in biological contexts to explain phenomena such as animal sex ratios (Fisher, 1958), territoriality (Smith & Price, 1973), coop- eration (Trivers, 1971), sexual displays (Zahavi, 1975), and parent—offspring con- flict (Trivers, 1974). More recently, evolutionary dynamic models have been applied

incumbency does not provide a defensive advantage and even when facing a more formidable intruder. Over the years, evi- dence has amassed to support Maynard Smith’s explanation, such as experimental manipulation of which animal arrives first (Davies, 1978; Sigg & Falett, 1985). Like other animals, we condition h