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ayel. 17 September 1982 UN Security Council Resolution 520 (Lebanon). 17 May 1983 Israel and Lebanon sign a peace agreement. 19 February 1986 King Hussein of Jordan severs ties with the PLO. 11 April 1987 London Agreement. 21 May 1987 Lebanon’s parliament abrogates the 1969 Cairo agreement with the PL
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023153 →he PLO had been financially dependent on the states of the Arab Gulf and the Communist bloc. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991 resulted in the collapse of funding for the PLO and an end to remittances to Palestinian families in Gaza and the West Ba
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023163 →lapse of the Soviet Union and Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991 resulted in t
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023163 →ng a lifeline for both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships. The implementation of the Declaration of Principles started in earnest in 1994, with Yasir Arafat’s spectacular arrival in Gaza and the rapid establishment of the Palestinian Authority. I had the pleasure of welcoming him on behalf of UN Secretary-G
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023164 →y Palestinian who really counted in those days -- Yasir Arafat. Erekat was a unique figure -- neither a fighter
990. When faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear we
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029721 →en faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear weapons to
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029721 →. One of the great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the Middle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hussein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up forces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029722 →y Palestinian who really counted in those days -- Yasir Arafat. Erekat was a unique figure -- neither a fighter
990. When faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear we
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029808 →en faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear weapons to
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029808 →. One of the great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the Middle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hussein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up forces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029809 →Entities connected to both Saddam Hussein and Yasir Arafat

Barack Obama
PERSON
George W. Bush
PERSON
United States
LOCATION
Bill Clinton
PERSON
Jeffrey Epstein
PERSON
Lebanon
LOCATION
Tehran
LOCATION
Benjamin Netanyahu
PERSON
Middle East
LOCATION
Hosni Mubarak
PERSON
Jerusalem
LOCATION
Donald Trump
PERSON
Damascus
LOCATION
Joe Biden
PERSON
Terje Rod-Larsen
PERSON
Tunisia
LOCATION
Cairo
LOCATION
Ronald Reagan
PERSON
Baghdad
LOCATION
Bahrain
LOCATION