Epstein Secrets

2) 10 United States v. Dionisio, 503 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007) 12 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 6, 7, 10 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 7 United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d 660 (2d Cir.1985) 9 United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1

ernment offers only one argument for why it should be permitted to prosecute Ms. Maxwell for these offenses. Relying on the Court's prior ruling and the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam), the government asserts that the NPA does not bind the U.S. Attorney'

the issue of its application on appeal." Sou v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1, 6 n.11 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal qu

ntiary standard leaves this circuit alone on an island. The Brown I majority suggested that its lenient view of the necessary evidence aligned with the Second Circuit's decision in Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999). See Brown I, 576 F.3d at 157 (citing Caridad, 191 F.3d at 293).

ned to prevent criminal activity and maintain security." Id. at *5 (quotation marks and ellipses omitted); see also Opinion and Order, Dkt. No. 59, Gonzalez v. ICE, No. 19-cv-2911 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2020), slip op. at 27-28 (requiring a "rational nexus" between withheld records and an agency's law

y communications about how to interact with the public may be subject to the deliberative process privilege and concluding, including by relying on the Second Circuit's decision in ACLU, 844 F.3d at 133, that "[a's long as communications are pre-decisional and deliberative, internal agency communications about publ

ned to prevent criminal activity and maintain security." Id. at *5 (quotation marks and ellipses omitted); see also Opinion and Order, Dkt. No. 59, Gonzalez v. ICE, No. 19-cv-2911 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2020), slip op. at 27-28 (requiring a "rational nexus" between withheld records and an agency's law

y communications about how to interact with the public may be subject to the deliberative process privilege and concluding, including by relying on the Second Circuit's decision in ACLU, 844 F.3d at 133, that "[a's long as communications are pre-decisional and deliberative, internal agency communications about publ

ned to prevent criminal activity and maintain security." Id. at *5 (quotation marks and ellipses omitted); see also Opinion and Order, Dkt. No. 59, Gonzalez v. ICE, No. 19-cv-2911 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2020), slip op. at 27-28 (requiring a "rational nexus" between withheld records and an agency's law

y communications about how to interact with the public may be subject to the deliberative process privilege and concluding, including by relying on the Second Circuit's decision in ACLU, 844 F.3d at 133, that "[a's long as communications are pre-decisional and deliberative, internal agency communications about publ

to consider it. A. Applicable Law Relevant evidence is "not confined to that which directly establishes an element of the crime." United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1997). As the Second Circuit has explained, "(t]o be relevant, evidence need only tend to prove the government's case, a

nment to identify the co-conspirator statements it plans to use at trial in its initial round of pretrial motions. There, the defendant argued that the Second Circuit's practice of conditional admission of co-conspirator statements at trial would prejudice her because "any cautionary instruction would be of doubtful

) 268 United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) 62 United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1967) 165 United States v. Gonzalez, No. 00 Cr. 447,2000 WL 1721171 85 United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948) 292 United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr

1) 268 United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) 62 United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1967) 165 United States v. Gonzalez, No. 00 Cr. 447, 2000 WL 1721171 85 United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948) 292 United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Faker establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pro

1) 268 United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) 62 United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1967) 165 United States v. Gonzalez, No. 00 Cr. 447, 2000 WL 1721171 85 United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948) 292 United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Faker establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pro

1) 176 United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) 43 United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1967) 112 United States v. Gonzalez, No. 00 Cr. 447, 2000 WL 1721171 58 United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948) 199 United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC

nited States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 922-25 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Jeffiies, 405 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2005). Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr