Epstein Secrets

or intimidation. These are the elements required by the statute, and they are not met here. Although CEOS could, perhaps, point to United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176 (11" Cir. 2007) as a case that, standing alone, involved wholly intrastate conduct, the facts of that case are far different in key re

nd coercive components that Congress, and administration policy statements intended in 18 U.S.C. § 1591 prosecutions. Evans, and his co-conspirators (Madison and Yearby) were not “Johns.” They operated a for profit prostitution ring marked by control of, and extreme violence toward, the victims, who they k

s co-conspirators. None of this type of activity comes close to the facts regarding Mr. Epstein. Finally, but significantly, the prostitution ring in Evans was not, in fact, entirely intrastate as the companion case of one of the Evans co-defendants makes clear. See, United States v. Madison, 477 F.3d 13

or intimidation. These are the elements required by the statute, and they are not met here. Although CEOS could, perhaps, point to United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2007) as a case that, standing alone, involved wholly intrastate conduct, the facts of that case are far different in key

co-conspirators. None of this type of activity comes close to the facts regarding Mr. Epstein. Finally, but significantly, the prostitution ring in Evans was not, in fact, entirely intrastate as the companion case of one of the Evans co-defendants makes clear. See, United States v. Madison, 477 F.3d 1

coercive components that Congress, and administration policy statements intended in 18 U.S.C. § 1591 prosecutions. Evans, and his co-conspirators (Madison and Yearby) were not "Johns." They operated a for profit prostitution ring marked by control of, and extreme violence toward, the victims, who they

or intimidation. These are the elements required by the statute, and they are not met here. Although CEOS could, perhaps, point to United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2007) as a case that, standing alone, involved wholly intrastate conduct, the facts of that case are far different in key

ution ring in Evans was not, in fact, entirely intrastate as the companion case of one of the Evans co-defendants makes clear. See, United States v. Madison, 477 F.3d 1312, 1313-1314 (11th Cir. 2007) (Jane Doe #2 stated that she traveled to Atlanta, Georgia with Madison to work as a prostitute). Thus, c

coercive components that Congress, and administration policy statements intended in 18 U.S.C. § 1591 prosecutions. Evans, and his co-conspirators (Madison and Yearby) were not "Johns." They operated a for profit prostitution ring marked by control of, and extreme violence toward, the victims, who they

or intimidation. These arc the elements required by the statute, and they are not met here. Although CEOS could, perhaps, point to United Slat% v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176 (11°' Cir. 2007) as a case that, standing alone, involved wholly intrastate conduct, the facts of that case are far different in key

coercive components that Congress, and administration policy statements intended in 18 U.S.C. § 1591 prosecutions. Evans, and his co-conspirators (Madison and Yeasty) were not "Johns." They operated a for profit prostitution ring marked by control of, and extreme violence toward, the victims, who they

makes clear. See, United States v. Madison, 477 F.3d 1312, 1313-1314 (11th Cir. 2007) (Jane Doe 42 stated that she traveled to Atlanta, Georgia with Madison to work as a prostitute). Thus, courts, including the Eleventh Circuit in Evans, have underscored the point that § 1591 simply is not intended to

BYNUM,T EDWARD KLEIN,GEORGE EVANS,LESLIE R SUNTRUST BANK TR RUTH R DOBBS

D DRAKE,RODMAN L HEPBURN,TED MASON,MARK FANJUL JR,ALFONSO EMBASSY APAR

ply. See United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Evans-Martinez, 448 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006). The Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held the opposite. See United States v. Irizarr

vestigative agency will lack any place to assert her right to fair treatment - in contravention of a teaching that traces back at least to Marbury v. Madison that "where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy." >*4 The Advisory Committee, however, seems to think that this is not a problem to