Epstein Secrets

d. VIII. DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICHARD MESSINO'S MOTION FOR PRODUCTION OF EXCULPATORY OR IMPEACHING MATERIAL Defendant seeks material pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Sp

nata testifies. The court finds the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.1991), instructive. In McClain, the Seventh Circuit approved admission of tapes even where the government did not put the non-defendant participant in the conversation on the stand. Id. at 832. The

t's alternatives are most relevant to this case. A specific employment practice or policy can comprise affirmative acts or inaction. Cf. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining an employer's responsibility to act to rectify a hostile or offensive work environment under Title VI

arse comments are not enough for class treatment — illustrated in cases like King v. General Electric Company, 960 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1992). There, the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs' anecdotal evidence in an age-discrimination case was not enough, even though the record contained testimony from a highe

convicted. Under these cir- cumstances we choose not to catalogue the S. Rich also argues that the Govemmeeyy breached its duty of disclosure under Brady Maryland. 373 U.S. 83. 83 S.Q. 1194. Ib L.Edld 313 (1963). by failing to release Was- goner's grand jury testimony. Under Brady, governmental supp

d States Medearis. 451 F.3d 918. 920-21 (8th Cir.2006) (quotations omitted). This is particularly compelling in the child pornography context, as the Seventh Circuit has aptly said: Young children were raped in order to enable the production of the pornography that the defendant both downloaded and uploaded-bo

exists to justify nondisclosure of witnesses to opposing counsel and thus noncompliance with Rule 12.1." 198 Similarly, in United States v. Elizondo, the Seventh Circuit cited Causey for the proposition that the protection of potential witnesses could justify postponing disclosure. '°? Following the reasoning of the S

lso United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (quoting Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559). 298 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470,474 (1973). 299 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 300 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). 301 United States v. Garrett, 238 F.3d 293, 302 (St