Epstein Secrets

when I retired, I would write a book pulling together the elements of investment philosophy discussed in my memos. But in 2009, I got an email from Warren Buffett saying that if I'd write a book, he'd give me a blurb for the jacket. It didn't take me long to move up my timing. Columbia Business School Publish

my memos. But in 2009, I got an email from Warren Buffett saying that if I'd write a book, he'd give me a

h them. • A lot has been written of late about reduced liquidity in the current investment environment, in part a result of restrictions under the Volcker rule. This may have contributed to last month's volatility, but it should be viewed as having exacerbated the short-term pain, not as altering the

er than with non- financial agents. One key driver of this explosive intrasystem activity came from the growth in derivative markets. In 2002, when Warren Buffet first expressed his view that "derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction"", markets—although booming— seemed remarkably stable. Their su

of cascades following failure) or to limit their activities (to curtail the potential for cross-contamination within firms). The recently proposed Volcker rule in the United States, quarantining risky hedge fund, private equity and proprietary trading activity from other areas of banking business, is

ant to question them. Really? Why? There are a vast number of unleveraged, deep-pocket investors around sniffing for bargains, including endowments, Warren Buffets, sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds, and so on. If a bank is really "illiquid" but not "insolvent," then just why will these investors not lend or

regulatory designation of and Moody ratings, the treatment of off-balance-sheet credit guarantees, and on and on and on. The thousand pages of the Volker rule alone can start a nice bonfire. If a crisis is a run, and we can remove or fix run-prone securities, none of these steps is either necessary 5