Epstein Secrets

nterpreted "to have real and substantial effect," Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), there can b

time of the underlying conduct unless there is a clear statement that an amendment should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997) ("Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the

nterpreted "to have real and substantial effect," Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), there can b

time of the underlying conduct unless there is a clear statement that an amendment should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997) ("Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the

nterpreted "to have real and substantial effect," Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), there can b

time of the underlying conduct unless there is a clear statement that an amendment should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997) ("Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the

nterpreted "to have real and substantial effect," Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), there can b

time of the underlying conduct unless there is a clear statement that an amendment should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997) ("Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the

nterpreted "to have real and substantial effect," Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), there can b

time of the underlying conduct unless there is a clear statement that an amendment should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997) ("Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the