Epstein Secrets

iful Russian student who changed her name to Anna Chapman by briefly marrying a British citizen she met at

be used to motivate someone to “act alone” in gathering espionage material. I next turned to an even more important KGB coup with Cher- kashin: the Robert Hanssen case. From the KGB’s perspective, Hans- sen was an extraordinary espionage source. He was a walk-in who @ never entered the Soviet embassy or met wi

n Russia: Human Rights Watch, Tanya Lokshina Anna Chapman: AP Photo/Sergei Karpukhin, Pool, File Poitras, G

are sent over the Internet. He told Greenwald, for example, that encryption was “critically necessary” for anyone to evade NSA surveillance. Just as Robert Hanssen had deliberately compromised the NSA’s interception of Soviet communications in Washington, D.C., in the 1990s, Snowden deliberately compromised the

er (when in fact she was speaking to an FBI agent who was impersonating one.) That unique password had been personally supplied to her by Poteyev. So Chapman had reason to believe Poteyev had betrayed her, When Chapman returned to Moscow after the spy exchange, she was taken to a well- publicized dinner w

ly mean such a mole does not exist. Historically, we have many notable cases in which Russian moles eluded intensive investigations for many decades. Robert Hanssen served as a KGB penetration in the FBI for over 20 years without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames, acted as a KGB mole in the CIA for more than