Epstein Secrets

Accuser-3's testimony. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The government and the defense agree on at least this much about Accuser-3: I. She was not a minor in the United Kingdom when she alleges that she was sexually abused by Jeffrey Epstein in 1994-1995; 2. She cannot establish that Ms. Maxwell or Jeffrey Epstein ever cau

681 (1988) 5, 6 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) 8 United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) 6, 7, 8 United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), of 'd sub nom. United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 8 United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3

Accuser-3's testimony. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The government and the defense agree on at least this much about Accuser-3: I. She was not a minor in the United Kingdom when she alleges that she was sexually abused by Jeffrey Epstein in 1994-1995; 2. She cannot establish that Ms. Maxwell or Jeffrey Epstein ever cau

681 (1988) 5, 6 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) 8 United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) 6, 7, 8 United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), of 'd sub nom. United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 8 United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3

endant takes issue with the Indictment's reference to these sex acts as "abuse" because, she asserts, Minor Victim-3 was above the age of consent in the United Kingdom at the time they occurred. The description in the Indictment is factually accurate, however, because Minor Victim- 3 will testify to her subjective

that may, on their own, be untimely can nevertheless serve as direct evidence of the existence of a charged conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Benussi, 216F. Supp. 2d 299, 301-07, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (admitting evidence of otherwise untimely acts during conspiracy trial); cf. United States v. Marc

endant takes issue with the Indictment's reference to these sex acts as "abuse" because, she asserts, Minor Victim-3 was above the age of consent in the United Kingdom at the time they occurred. The description in the Indictment is factually accurate, however, because Minor Victim- 3 will testify to her subjective

that may, on their own, be untimely can nevertheless serve as direct evidence of the existence of a charged conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301-07, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (admitting evidence of otherwise untimely acts during conspiracy trial); cf. United States v. Mar

endant takes issue with the Indictment's reference to these sex acts as "abuse" because, she asserts, Minor Victim-3 was above the age of consent in the United Kingdom at the time they occurred. The description in the Indictment is factually accurate, however, because Minor Victim- 3 will testify to her subjective

that may, on their own, be untimely can nevertheless serve as direct evidence of the existence of a charged conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301-07, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (admitting evidence of otherwise untimely acts during conspiracy trial); cf. United States v. Mar

motion takes issue with the Indictment's reference to these sex acts as "abuse" because, the assert, Minor Victim-3 was above the age of consent in the United Kingdom at the time they occurred. The description in the Indictment is factually accurate, however, because Minor Victim-3 subjectively experienced these

that may, on their own, be untimely can nevertheless serve as direct evidence of the existence of a charged conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301-07, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (admitting evidence of otherwise untimely acts during conspiracy trial); cl United States v. Marc

endant takes issue with the Indictment's reference to these sex acts as "abuse" because, she asserts, Minor Victim-3 was above the age of consent in the United Kingdom at the time they occurred. The description in the Indictment is factually accurate, however, because Minor Victim- 3 will testify to her subjective

that may, on their own, be untimely can nevertheless serve as direct evidence of the existence of a charged conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301-07, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (admitting evidence of otherwise untimely acts during conspiracy trial); cf. United States v. Mar