Epstein Secrets

ttlement Conference, or in the Alternative, Motion to Direct Parties back to Mediation, Doe v. Epstein, No. 9:08-CV-80893 (S.D. Fla. June 28, 2010) (Marra, J.) (doc. #168) attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Notably, Epstein sought this settlement conference — and ultimately made his payments as a result

there was some improper coercion involved in, for example, Jane Doe's case, his remedy was to raise the matter before Federal District Court Judge Kenneth A. Marra who was presiding over the matter. Far from raising any such claim, Epstein simply chose to settle that case. He is therefore now barred by the doct

ity and Inv. Corp., 615 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod 263 U.S. 149, 153-154 (1923) (Brandeis, J.). In the circumstances of this case, a reasonable finder of fact would have "evidence of the most persuasive character" from Epstein's repeated

rental car. victim. A motion may be filed before Judge Marra on the issue of inappropriate contact with and h

island. knew of other gifts given to , including Secret lingerie, birthday flowers, and a rental car. victim. A motion may be filed before Judge Marra on the issue of inappropriate contact with and harassment of M. 3 EFTA00191647 The one recruit whom I have kept in the indictment is Z. She is

hey must be resolved in the crucible, f a live contro- versy (see Ashwander TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47, 56 S.Ct. 466, 482-83, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur- ring)), nothing in this opinion should be construed as either subscribing to or dis- avowing either Cirrincione or Hazzard. But as bot

he is transferring them to. Cf. Special Purpose Accounts Receivable Co-op Corp. v. Prime One Capital Co., L.L.C., 2007 WL 4482611 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (Marra, J.) (refusing to 15 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 165 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2009 Page 16 of 41 CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON

t 06/19/2009 Page 10 of 41 CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON The silence in the face of these questions speaks far louder than words. As Justice Brandeis recognized long ago, "[s]ilence is often evidence of the most persuasive character."' Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (quoting U.S.

at there was some improper coercion involved in, for example, Jane Doe's case, his remedy was to raise the matter before Federal District Court Judge Kenneth A. Marra who was presiding over the matter. Far from raising any such claim, Epstein simply chose to settle that case. He was therefore barred by the doctrine

er before Federal District Court Judge Kenneth A. Marra who was presiding over the matter. Far from raisi

rity and Inv. Corp., 615 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla. 4" Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-154 (1923) (Brandeis, J.). In the circumstances of this case, a reasonable finder of fact would have "evidence of the most persuasive character" from Epstein's repeated r